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Abstract 
In recent years, nonviolent conflict has increasingly captured both popular and academic 
attention. One established feature of nonviolent conflict is intriguing; it often arises in highly 
repressive circumstances commonly thought to hinder collective action. It is this 
incongruence between theory and empirics I seek to illuminate. Thus, it is the aim of the 
thesis to contribute both to the repression literature and the nascent quantitative research on 
nonviolent campaign onset.  
I propose an integrated theoretical framework based on two of the major theories of 
conflict onset, grievance theory and political opportunity structure approaches. Although 
these are often depicted as opposing, I contend that they are in fact complementary. I further 
suggest that conflict arises based on a grievance-opportunity function, in which it is the 
changes in either grievances or opportunities that induce contentious action, of which 
repression can be both. Thus, the research question is ‘does repressive instability increase the 
likelihood of nonviolent conflict?’ 
 I put forth seven hypotheses, four of which are tested on annual data for 149 states 
between 1972 and 2006. The analysis finds empirical evidence that liberalization of civil 
liberties repression increases the likelihood of nonviolent conflict onset, though it does not 
have a significant effect upon violent conflict. Thus, the results conform to other quantitative 
studies of nonviolent conflict in emphasizing that the causes of violent and nonviolent 
conflicts are fundamentally different. Furthermore, the findings in this thesis suggest that the 
present inconclusive efforts to establish a unitary effect of repression upon dissent may be 
aided by accounting for the many facets and possible effects of the concept of repression.  
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1 Introduction 
 
 
“(…) the most perilous moment for a bad government is one when it 
seeks to mend its ways.” 
 
 Alexis de Tocqueville (1955: 177) 
. 
 
The self-immolation of Mohamed Bouazizi on the 17
th
 of December 2010 initiated the 
nonviolent revolution in Tunisia, and sparked an unexpected wave of popular contention 
throughout the Middle East which challenged some of the most entrenched and repressive 
dictatorships in the region. Conflict scholarship and political analysts were wholly unprepared 
for this monumental event – there were no predictions of a sweep of dissent through the 
repressive Arab states (Weyland, 2012: 917). Rather, established theories of dissent postulate 
repression as a deterrent to popular uprisings (e.g.,Goldstone & Tilly, 2001; Gurr, 1968, 1970; 
Tarrow, 1998; Tilly, 1978).  
 The phenomenon, though unexpected, is not unique. Countless despots have fallen to 
the sheer power of their aggrieved subjects in common uprising. Sharp (1973) called the 
mechanism behind it the ‘Theory of Power’, and emphasized the dependence of the ruler on 
the quiescence and cooperation from the ruled. Withdrawal of public consent, Sharp 
theorized, will eliminate the pillars of power the dictator relies on and produce revolution 
without the necessity of armed force.  
In the years following the so-called Arab Spring, nonviolent conflict has received 
greatly increased attention, both in scholarship and media. With their seminal book, Why Civil 
Resistance Works: The Strategic Logic of Nonviolent Conflict, Chenoweth and Stephan 
(2011) pioneered the global quantitative research on nonviolent conflict – a field thus far 
dominated by qualitative analyses. In their analysis of major maximalist campaigns, the 
authors emphasized the notion derived from observing the Arab Spring – nonviolent conflict 
is not only possible in highly repressive conditions, it is in fact most prevalent in autocracies 
(Chenoweth & Stephan, 2011: 66).  
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While the nascent quantitative research field on nonviolent conflict following 
Chenoweth and Stephan (2011) have re-affirmed this relationship between repressive 
circumstances and nonviolent conflict (Butcher & Svensson, 2014; Chenoweth & Lewis, 
2013d; Chenoweth & Ulfelder, 2015; Cunningham, 2013; Sutton, Butcher, & Svensson, 
2014), no study has sought to explain the discrepancy between theories claiming repression as 
a deterrent and the apparent predisposition of autocracies to nonviolent conflict. The 
overarching puzzle I seek to unravel in this thesis is thus why repressive regimes experience 
high levels of civil resistance, despite the postulation that repression deters conflict.  
Specifically, two theories of contention argue that repressive regimes will be able to 
deter revolts. Grievance theory, as presented by Gurr (1968; 1970: 15), argues that politicized 
grievances produced by relative deprivation will produce civil conflict, but that governmental 
monopoly of coercive power – or highly repressive circumstances – will stifle dissent.  
Political opportunity structure (POS) scholars, such as Tarrow (1998), view repression 
as a constraining feature of the political opportunity structure in which the dissidents operate 
– in other words, repression increases the costs of rebellion. Highly repressive states should 
therefore, according to Tarrow (1998: 19-20), be less likely to experience conflict than less 
repressive states, because the cost-benefit analysis of the rational dissidents is less favorable 
in such regimes. Yet the paradox remains – nonviolent conflict occurs, in absolute numbers, 
more in autocracies than in less challenging circumstances (Chenoweth & Stephan, 2011: 66).  
Scholarship has suggested that nonviolent dissenters are more adept than their armed 
counterparts at affecting defections from the repressive apparatus of the regime (Nepstad, 
2013), and that repressive measures against nonviolent campaigns are likely to produce a 
backlash-effect of increased mobilization rather than the intended quiescence (Francisco, 
1995, 1996, 2004; Rasler, 1996; Sutton et al., 2014). However, none have sought to reconcile 
the established conflict theories and the empirical evidence presented above, and some have 
even suggested that as these theories are not able to provide satisfactory explanations for 
nonviolent conflict we should refocus our efforts towards actor-agency instead (Chenoweth & 
Ulfelder, 2015).  
While I do not deny the relevance of actor-agency in nonviolent conflict research, it is 
my contention that the established conflict theories may still provide important insights into 
the occurrence of nonviolent dissent. Rather than dismissing the theoretical contributions of 
scholars such as Gurr and Tarrow, I argue that their theoretical propositions must be 
scrutinized more thoroughly. Though grievance theory and POS-approaches are often posed 
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as contradictory and irreconcilable contenders for one singular explanation of civil conflict, I 
propose a unification of the two theories. I do this because they are not in fact opposing, nor 
irreconcilable, though their emphases on conflict-inducing factors differ.  
Grievance theory emphasizes discontent arising from a disadvantageous change in 
individuals’ value calculus – i.e., what they feel entitled to relative to what they believe they 
are capable of obtaining – as the basis for all civil conflict (Gurr, 1970: 13). POS-approaches 
posit changes in the political opportunity structure as the instigating factor (Tarrow, 1998: 
20). However, Tarrow (1998: 6) concedes that grievances are an underlying factor – no 
rational actor would pay the cost of conflict unless he had pressing reason to do so. Likewise, 
Gurr (1970: 15) recognizes the possible constraint of the political system, citing governmental 
monopoly of coercive power as an explanation for unaddressed, long-standing grievances. 
Notably, both scholars highlight change as relevant in explaining conflict onset, and neither 
fundamentally denies the other’s explanatory factors. Rather, it seems to be an argument of 
precedence. I propose, based on these theories, that conflict is a function of both grievances 
and political opportunity, where changes in either may produce conflict, given the existence 
of the other.  
While this may seem a modest modification to the theories – and in fact, it is intended 
to be – it has important implications, not only for research on internal conflict. The literature 
on repression has not been able, despite intense and admirable efforts, to pinpoint the effect of 
repression upon dissent. The only consistency in analyses of the Repression-Dissent Nexus is 
that of controversy – with disparate findings suggesting negative, positive, non-linear, and 
non-existent effects of repression upon dissent (Davenport, 2007a: 7-8; Earl, 2006: 134; 2011: 
264). Davenport (2007a: 8) dubs this inconsistency in view of the relatively consistent 
findings that dissent increases repression ‘the Punishment Puzzle’.  
Based on a unified grievance-opportunity framework, I propose an explanation of 
change to the ‘Punishment Puzzle’. Because repression is viewed both as a source of 
grievance and a constraining factor in the literature, and can credibly be construed as both, it 
is no wonder that inconsistent effects have been produced. Instead of focusing on the strength, 
timing, or consistency of repression, I propose that repression is both a source of grievance 
and a political constraint, and that it is changes in the repressive levels of a state that produce 
conflict. Thus my research question is,  
Research question: Does repressive instability increase the likelihood of 
nonviolent conflict? 
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Based on this research question and the grievance-opportunity function of conflict from 
the theoretical framework, I posit seven hypotheses. The first four relate to the liberalization 
of repression, and the final three to the autocratization of repressive policies. In the first four 
hypotheses, the proposed relationship between liberalization and conflict onset is positive – 
when liberalization occurs, conflict onset is more likely. This is derived from the grievance-
opportunity function, and presumes some initial level of repression. Furthermore, I posit that 
when civil liberties repression is reduced, the probability of nonviolent conflict onset is 
increased. This hypothesis is derived from a combination of features of nonviolent campaigns 
relative to violent campaigns, and the grievance-opportunity function. 
For the final three hypotheses, autocratization is posited to have opposite effects given 
the outset – in repressive states, increased repression will close the opportunity structure and 
hamper dissidence, but in liberal states, increased repression will be a source of grievance and 
increase the likelihood of conflict onset.  
 As can often be the case with theory-driven research, I am not able to test all seven 
hypotheses. Due to lack of available and suitable data, the number of hypotheses I am able to 
test is restricted to four of the seven.  Therefore, I test these on a dataset of major maximalist 
campaigns, containing state-year data for 149 non-free independent states between 1972 and 
2006. I find support for the hypothesis that liberalization increases the likelihood of 
nonviolent conflict, while the other three hypotheses do not receive sufficient empirical 
support to reject their null hypotheses. Thus, the conclusion is that repressive instability, in 
the form of liberalization, does increase the likelihood of nonviolent conflict in states that are 
not fully liberal – or non-free – between 1972 and 2006.  
With this thesis, I aim to contribute both to the repression literature, and to the nascent 
quantitative quest to understand the origins of nonviolent conflict (e.g., Butcher & Svensson, 
2014; Chenoweth & Lewis, 2013d; Chenoweth & Ulfelder, 2015; Cunningham, 2013). There 
are several reasons why studying nonviolent campaigns is relevant and important. First, as 
well as being prevalent in autocracies, they have been found to be more successful than their 
armed counterparts in overturning established dictatorships, and establishing subsequent 
democracy and sustained peace (Celestino & Gleditsch, 2013; Chenoweth & Stephan, 2011). 
Additionally, in recent years, the importance of understanding the origins and causes 
of nonviolent campaigns has increased due to the phenomenon’s increasing prevalence in the 
international system, and that they have been found to be the most common cause of dictator 
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exit (Kendall-Taylor & Frantz, 2014). Thus, studying nonviolent conflict is justified by its 
potential to affect lasting change, as well as its prominence in the system, and its potency for 
success relative to violent conflict (Celestino & Gleditsch, 2013; Chenoweth & Lewis, 2013d; 
Chenoweth & Stephan, 2011; Kendall-Taylor & Frantz, 2014). 
 Likewise, I seek to propose yet another solution to ‘the Punishment Puzzle’, as well 
as amending the lack of quantitative research on liberalization of repression, as lamented by 
Christian Davenport (2007a: 12). As shown earlier, the hypothesis of a relationship between 
repression liberalization and conflict is not only no novelty, it is 159 years old – and to my 
knowledge thus far untested quantitatively. Finally, combining the repression research and 
nonviolent conflict research is not only desirable, but also quite necessary, as theory has 
linked the two for decades.  
1.1 Thesis Disposition 
Chapter 2 – Literature Review– sketches out the literature on the subject of nonviolence, and 
repression to date, respectively, as well as the existing scholarship on the relationship between 
repression and nonviolence. Chapter 3 – Definitions and Concepts – give detailed definitions 
of the central concepts applied in this thesis, before Chapter 4 – Theoretical Framework – 
outlines the two theories combined for the theoretical background for the present analysis. 
Chapter 5 – Research Design – describes the operationalizations of the variables, the dataset, 
and the statistical model of the thesis, as well as the methodological concerns related to it. 
Chapter 6 – Analysis – contains the multinomial regression analysis, as well as simulated 
quantities of interest, an evaluation of the hypotheses, robustness checks, and goodness of fit 
assessments of the models in the analysis. In Chapter 7 – Final Thoughts – I recapitulate the 
findings in Chapter 6, address the limitations of this analysis, and remark on possible future 
avenues of research opened up by this thesis.  
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2 Literature Review 
 
This chapter will review central contributions to the nonviolent conflict literature and 
repression literature, respectively, before outlining the remaining gaps in the research field as 
it stands currently.  
2.1 The Study of Nonviolent Dissent 
The study of nonviolent conflict has, until recently, primarily been qualitative. There are, 
however, several important historical and descriptive works that have heavily influenced 
today’s research, both through analytical tools and through descriptive efforts. This paragraph 
will outline a few. 
With his seminal three-volume epos, Sharp (1973: 8) established the theoretical 
foundation for the study of nonviolent civil unrest (Chenoweth & Stephan, 2011:21; Schock, 
2013). In his three volume opus, The Politics of Nonviolent Action, he first outlined the 
influential theory of power. He argued that all state leaders rule at the mercy of their citizens – 
they depend upon the cooperation or acquiescence of the ruled. If the citizenry withdraw their 
consent or cooperation, the ruler’s power and ability to rule begins to lessen (Sharp, 1973: 8). 
The following two volumes describe the various methods of nonviolent action, as well as the 
process through which a successful nonviolent campaign is waged.  
Discussing the ramifications of nonviolent insurrections, Zunes (1994) systematically 
investigates why nonviolent campaigns have increased in numbers throughout the Third 
World. He argues that certain characteristics of nonviolent resistance make it strategically 
favorable over armed struggle, given the context in which contention occurs. He notes the 
relative efficacy of nonviolence over violence in achieving the stated goals, and argues that 
this is explained by the fact that unlike its armed counterpart, nonviolent dissidence 
delegitimizes government repression; that unarmed movements allow for larger and broader 
participation; and that nonviolent resistance creates alternative institutions to those of the 
government which further undermine the status quo, and form the basis for a new order 
(Zunes, 1994: 411-418). 
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A Force More Powerful (Ackerman & DuVall, 2000) is an empirical description of 
how nonviolent tactics have been employed in conflicts between state and citizens throughout 
the past century. While it provides important insights and descriptions, as well as accessibility 
of the topic, it does not attempt to provide any analytic tools nor generalize across cases. The 
bibliography of nonviolent action provided by A. Carter, Clark, and Randle (2006) also adds 
to the descriptive works of nonviolent conflict throughout the 20
th
 and 21
st
 centuries.   
 Schock’s (2005) Unarmed Insurrections: People Power Movements in 
Nondemocracies is one of the earliest cross-national comparative studies of political 
contention (Chenoweth & Stephan, 2011: 22; Schock, 2005: xviii-xix). In his analysis of six 
nonviolent campaigns in non-democracies, Schock merges the strategic trajectory literature 
on nonviolent campaigns with the structural focus of political process approaches, in order to 
advance both research fields and bridge the structure-agency divide (Chenoweth & Stephan, 
2011; Schock, 2005: xviii-xix). Schock also highlights the importance of popular quiescence 
in maintaining dictatorships; without tacit or overt consent from its people, even the most 
powerful must eventually crumble (Schock, 2005: 37-38). 
Additionally, several other qualitative works have built upon these foundations, to 
provide key insights to what distinguishes and drives nonviolent campaigns. The Freedom 
House report by Karatnycky and Ackerman (2005) established a link between civil resistance 
and democratic transitions, which has influenced the research field in later years. Nepstad 
(2013) suggests that security defections are somewhat dependent on the strategy choice of the 
dissidents, with nonviolent actors being more adept at eliciting them than their violent 
counterparts. Others have suggested that electoral fraud makes nondemocratic regimes more 
vulnerable to nonviolent action  (Beissinger, 2013:261), and that election years provide 
politicized focal points in which the populace may be increasingly inclined to rise up against 
the regime (Tucker, 2007). Furthermore, participation in nonviolent activism has been found 
to increase awareness of the governmental oppressive behavior being resisted, suggesting a 
reinforcing effect of activism (Davenport & Trivedi, 2013), and nonviolent tactics has been 
shown to be the most prevalent way of ousting incumbent dictatorships (Kendall-Taylor & 
Frantz, 2014: 40).  
  While these works all provide invaluable insights to and theoretical foundations of the 
nature of nonviolent conflict, they provide no generalizable explanations for the origins and 
outcomes of nonviolent campaigns. The following paragraphs will outline the quantitative 
efforts made in recent years to amend this fact.  
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2.2 The Quantitative Study of Nonviolent 
Campaigns 
Within social sciences research, quantitative analyses of civil dissent against government have 
been dominated by a focus on civil war. This neglect of comparative quantitative work on 
nonviolence has been explained by the death tolls of civil war, as well as an errant assumption 
that nonviolence occurs when dissident resources do not permit civil war (Chenoweth & 
Stephan, 2011: 7).  
With Chenoweth and Stephan’s (2011) seminal work, a new era of quantitative 
research of nonviolent conflict ensued. The nonviolent campaign dataset they created, 
NAVCO 1.0, provided the opportunity for empirical testing of several theoretical claims, and 
the authors themselves disproved the oft-stated ‘truth’ that violence equals efficacy. Their 
analysis proved that the success rate of nonviolent campaigns is markedly higher than that of 
violent campaigns (Chenoweth & Stephan, 2011: 7).  
In the aftermath of this study, nonviolent campaigns have received a much-needed 
increase in attention in conflict studies. With the release of NAVCO 2.0, in which the unit of 
analysis is campaign-year, analyses comparable to those previously done on civil war are 
possible – though this nascent area of study is still fairly limited (Chenoweth & Cunningham, 
2013: 274; Chenoweth & Lewis, 2013d: 421).  
The first focal point of the quantitative literature on nonviolent conflict was on the 
outcome of nonviolent campaigns relative to violent campaigns. Chenoweth and Stephan 
(2011: 60-61) established that nonviolent resistance is not only more effective than violent 
resistance in effecting regime transitions, but also more likely to produce stable and viable 
democracies, as was suggested by Karatnycky and Ackerman (2005). Celestino and Gleditsch 
(2013) subsequent study confirmed these results, finding that nonviolent campaigns are more 
likely to result in regime transition, and that this transition is more likely to lead to 
democracy, than in the cases of violent campaigns or no campaigns.  
Svensson and Lindgren (2011) argue that the success of a violent campaign is 
dependent on what aspect of the state’s legitimacy it is challenging. If the campaign is against 
the vertical legitimacy of the state – i.e. the political and institutional apparatus and the 
regime’s right to govern – it is likely to be more successful than a campaign seeking to 
challenge the horizontal state legitimacy – i.e. the perception of the state as representative of 
the larger community (Svensson & Lindgren, 2011: 98). Challenging the horizontal 
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legitimacy of the state is likely to sow discord within and between groups in the community, 
and if the community is divided, withdrawing consent will be difficult if possible at all 
(Svensson & Lindgren, 2011: 98).  
2.2.1 The Causes of Nonviolent Conflict 
Thus far we know far less about the origins of nonviolent conflict than we do about its 
outcome, especially when we consider the attention afforded civil war onset (e.g.,Collier & 
Hoeffler, 2004; Collier, Hoeffler, & Rohner, 2009; Fearon, Kasara, & Laitin, 2007; Fearon & 
Laitin, 2003; Hegre, 2014; Hegre, Ellingsen, Gates, & Gleditsch, 2001; Hegre & Sambanis, 
2006). However expansion of the NAVCO dataset has spurred interest in the questions of 
why and when nonviolent campaigns emerge (Butcher & Svensson, 2014; Chenoweth & 
Cunningham, 2013; Chenoweth & Lewis, 2013d: 416; Chenoweth & Ulfelder, 2015; 
Cunningham, 2013; Sutton et al., 2014). 
In a preliminary analysis of the NAVCO 2.0 dataset Chenoweth and Lewis (2013d) 
found that, using the model specified by Fearon and Laitin (2003), there is a clear divergence 
in the causes of violent and nonviolent campaigns. The only variable predicting conflict of 
both types was population – in other words, countries with a large population is more prone to 
conflict of either character than those with small populations. Otherwise, the predictors from 
the original model were either insignificant or reversed for nonviolent conflict  (Chenoweth & 
Lewis, 2013d: 420). The results suggest that the existing statistical models of conflict onset 
between government and citizenry – i.e. models of causes of civil war – cannot necessarily be 
applied to nonviolent conflict because they are essentially different.   
In her analysis of self-determination disputes, Cunningham (2013), fuses the hitherto 
separate fields of research of violent and nonviolent resistance in an effort to discover the 
determinants of civil war and nonviolent campaigns relative to conventional politics, 
respectively. Her results confirm the insights from Chenoweth and Lewis (2013d); nonviolent 
resistance and civil war do have divergent determinants. While larger self-determination 
groups operating in states at lower levels of economic development that have kin in adjoining 
states and are internally fragmented are more likely to engage in civil war relative to 
conventional politics, smaller groups operating in non-democracies that are less 
geographically concentrated are more likely to employ nonviolent resistance (Cunningham, 
2013:299-301). However, she also finds that both nonviolent resistance and civil war are 
more likely relative to conventional politics if the self-determination group is excluded from 
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political power, face economic discrimination and makes independence demands 
(Cunningham, 2013: 300). 
 Butcher and Svensson (2014) draw upon resource mobilization theory, and argue that 
the determinants of violent and nonviolent campaigns diverge because the tactics have 
different resource mobilization demands and thus draw upon different social networks for 
mobilization. Nonviolent campaigns require mass mobilization as well as leverage over the 
regime. Thus, the authors argue that extensive social networks with economic 
interdependence with the regime – labor organizations – increase the feasibility of nonviolent 
conflict especially. Their argument is empirically supported; while a high proportion of 
manufacturing goods to GDP increases the likelihood of nonviolent conflict, the relationship 
between the labor organization-proxy and violent conflict is both negative and insignificant  
(Butcher & Svensson, 2014: 15). Butcher and Svensson thus conclude that industrialization 
creates structural conditions that favor nonviolent conflict – corroborating theories of 
modernization and conflict hitherto unsupported by empirics (2014: 21-22). 
In the most recent contribution within the field, Chenoweth and Ulfelder (2015) seek 
to discover whether structural conditions can in fact predict the onset of major maximalist 
nonviolent campaigns. They specify models based on the four most prevalent theories within 
civil unrest scholarship – grievance theory, resource mobilization theory, modernization 
theory, and political opportunity approaches – and assess their relative explanatory power by 
comparing their predictive ability (Chenoweth & Ulfelder, 2015: 4). Their findings suggest 
that of the four theories, the model specified based on the political opportunity approaches 
performs the best – followed by grievance theory and resource mobilization. However, 
according to Chenoweth and Ulfelder, a culled model of the strongest variables is still not 
performing well enough to conclude that structural conditions trump agency-based 
approaches in explaining the occurrence of nonviolent campaigns (Chenoweth & Ulfelder, 
2015: 22). 
Of these studies, four are global and inclusive. Cunningham (2013) confines her 
analysis to self-determination disputes, which limits the degree to which her results could be 
generalized across all nonviolent campaigns. The remaining four analyses (Butcher & 
Svensson, 2014; Chenoweth & Lewis, 2013d; Chenoweth & Stephan, 2011; Chenoweth & 
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Ulfelder, 2015) utilize global data without restrictions to grievances or actors
1
, and it is in this 
company this thesis seeks to expand the literature. 
Although Chenoweth and Ulfelder apply both grievance-based and political 
opportunity theories to create their models, the models do not perform as well as one might 
expect given their standing within civil unrest literature (Chenoweth & Ulfelder, 2015: 22). 
The authors conclude that this is because agency is more relevant than structure, though they 
concede that there is a possibility that the models are misspecified (Chenoweth & Ulfelder, 
2015: 21). It is my contention that the models aren’t necessarily misspecified nor are 
structural conditions irrelevant. However, I do propose an alternative theoretical approach, in 
which their two best performing theories – grievance and political opportunity approaches – 
are combined (see 4.3 A Grievance-Opportunity Approach).   
Most analyses of nonviolent campaigns include a measure of repression – either as an 
explanatory variable or as a control for spurious effects. Repression research and the nascent 
quantitative nonviolent conflict scholarship are intrinsically linked – though both could 
benefit from a greater interaction of the two fields. This thesis will attempt to use quantitative 
analysis to further illuminate the relationship between governmental repression and 
nonviolent conflict. 
2.3 Repression and Dissent 
The connection between repression and dissent is essential within repression scholarship (for 
reviews, see Davenport, 2007a; Earl, 2011). The scholarship on repression and dissent can 
roughly be divided into two strands; studies on the origins of government repression, and 
analyses seeking to explain the relationship between repression and dissent. This section will 
outline the major findings within both strands.  
2.3.1 When Governments Repress 
The effect of dissent upon repression has consistently been established as positive, both 
formally and empirically (Carey, 2006; Davenport, 2007a; Ginkel & Smith, 1999; Shadmehr, 
2014) – regimes tend to respond to civil unrest with repression. State repression is commonly 
                                                 
1
 Note that these three studies utilize either the NAVCO 1.0, NAVCO 2.0, or Major Episodes of Contention 
(MEC) datasets, and therefore the coding rules for these datasets do act as a certain limitation with regards to 
what campaigns, as well as which grievances or stated goals (i.e. ‘maximalist’), are included in the analyses.  
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understood as the result of a cost-benefit analysis, in which the costs of repression is weighed 
against the benefits of the continuation of the status quo (Nordås & Davenport, 2013: 928), 
and when faced with popular contention, governments react with repressive measures. This 
phenomenon has been dubbed the ‘Law of Coercive Responsiveness’ (Davenport, 2007a: 7).  
Further scholarship seeking to answer the question of why governments repress their 
citizens has thus focused on establishing the contextual factors that increase the likelihood of 
government repression. This section outlines the trends in this research so far. 
 In an early quantitative study, Henderson (1991: 132) found that the extent of societal 
inequality, democracy, and the economic growth rate all provide explanatory power with 
regards to the use of repression by the government. Subsequently, the connection between 
polity and repressive government policies has received copious amounts of attention from 
scholars. 
Stable institutional democracy has consistently been associated with low levels of 
repression (Carey, 2006, 2010; Davenport, 1995, 2004; Davenport & Armstrong, 2004; Fein, 
1995; Henderson, 1991; Mesquita, Downs, Smith, & Cherif, 2005; Poe & Tate, 1994; Regan 
& Henderson, 2002; Zanger, 2000). The difference in levels of repressiveness between 
democracies and autocracies has been explained by the divergent threat perceptions of the two 
regime types; democracies are both less likely to experience anti-government threats and less 
likely to perceive dissent as threatening to the regime’s survival (Davenport, 1995: 703).  
Further analyses have established that both complete democracies and autocracies are 
less repressive than mixed regimes – or anocracies. This phenomenon was dubbed the 
‘Murder in the Middle Hypothesis’ by Fein (1995: 184). Regan and Henderson (2002) 
conclude that there is an inverted U-relationship between regime type and political repression, 
and attribute this to the level of threats the regime is facing. In complete autocracies, fear of 
retribution discourages threats to the regime, while in democracies institutional channels 
relieve discontent without threatening the state as such. In semi-democracies, demands are 
great yet no such channels exist, thus repression is greater (Regan & Henderson, 2002: 133).  
The relationship between threats and governmental repressive behavior has been 
further explored, and Carey (2010: 182-183) concludes that while fully institutionalized 
democracies have a lower risk of repression onset than other regimes, democracies under 
severe threat are not immune to applying repressive behavior. Davenport (2007b: 499-500) 
finds significant variations within autocracies – single-party regimes are less likely to engage 
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in repression, while military regimes are less restrictive of civil liberties, relative to other 
autocratic regimes. 
Regime transitions have also been found to increase repression (Davenport, 2004; 
Davenport & Armstrong, 2004; Zanger, 2000). Both democratization and autocratization have 
been associated with higher levels of repression, though Davenport and Armstrong (2004: 
551) suggest the existence of a threshold of democracy above which democratic institutions 
reduce repressive behavior. This threshold of democratic pacification has subsequently found 
additional empirical support (Mesquita et al., 2005).  
Scholarship has also been focused on what qualities in dictators and heads of state 
affect repressive behavior (Frantz & Kendall-Taylor, 2014; Ritter, 2014; Young, 2009). 
Positional security of state leaders has been found to reduce the costs of implementing 
favored policies and increase bargaining power in relation to dissidents, and therefore reduce 
repression violating personal integrity (Young, 2009: 296). Similarly, increases in executive 
job security have been found to decrease the likelihood that repression will occur in the first 
place, but increase the severity of observed violations (Ritter, 2014:158). Dictatorial reliance 
on cooptation through the use of legislature and political parties increases incentives to use 
political terror, while decreasing the need for empowerment rights restrictions, like 
censorship. Cooptation allows the dictator to draw the opposition out, which makes it easier to 
identify, gauge and monitor, but increases the risk of rivals will use their position to usurp the 
dictator, which generates incentives to increase physical integrity violations (Frantz & 
Kendall-Taylor, 2014: 9-11)  
Other scholars have focused on environmental aspects in their analyses of repression. 
Nordås and Davenport (2013: 933) argue that because ‘youth bulges’ make states more 
susceptible to dissent and especially political violence, regimes are forewarned about potential 
civil unrest. In an effort to deter dissent in such circumstances, the government increases 
repression. The authors find that this relationship is supported empirically, even when 
controlled for actual protest behavior; governments in states experiencing youth bulges are 
more repressive than others. Danneman and Ritter (2014: 268) argue that conflict in 
neighboring countries will give autocrats incentives to increase domestic repression – not in 
an effort to emulate their neighboring state leaders but rather to avoid their fate. Their analysis 
provides empirical evidence that states with neighbors engaged in civil war repress more. 
Both these studies find support that dictators apply preemptive repression when they face 
threats of future dissent.  
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2.3.2 The Effect of Government Repression on Dissent 
In contrast to the relative agreement on the effect of dissent upon repression, the only 
consistency in research on the effect of repression upon dissent is that it is controversial 
(Davenport, 2007a: 7; Earl, 2006: 134; 2011: 267). The question of the effect of repressive 
policies upon dissent is at the center of repression research, and yet both theoretical 
approaches and empirical analyses have yielded widely diverging answers.  
Scholars who follow the political opportunity structure (POS) approach argue that 
coercive government policy reduces dissent and movement mobilization by increasing the 
cost of participation and collective action (DeNardo, 1985; McAdam & Tarrow, 2000; Muller 
& Weede, 1990; Tarrow, 1998; Tilly, 1978). When costs are imposed – or opportunity 
structures closed – individuals and groups are less willing to participate in collective action, 
and dissent stifled (Koopmans, 1997; Opp & Roehl, 1990; Tarrow, 1998; Tilly, 1978). 
Grievance-based theories and analyses propose an opposite effect; repressive measures 
by government officials radicalize and aggrieve the population, and thereby increase 
mobilization and civil strife (Gurr, 1970; Hirsch, 1990; Opp & Roehl, 1990). In this strand of 
research, repression is seen as a motivational factor; when the regime applies physical 
sanctions and restriction of liberty, the population is outraged, and therefore increases their 
commitment to the cause. The proponents of grievance-based analyses expect increased 
repression to be met by increased dissent.  
Yet other theorists and analysts argue that the connection between repression and 
dissent is more complex than the monotonic positive or negative relationships proposed 
above. Some argue that the relationship is U-curved (Lichbach & Gurr, 1981; Shadmehr, 
2014), others suggest that it is an inverted U-shape (DeNardo, 1985; Francisco, 1996; Hibbs, 
1973). Some scholars suggest that timing is important: in the short-run, repression deters 
dissent, while in the long-run, repression increases dissent (Rasler, 1996: 148), and a 
reciprocal relationship has also been proposed (Carey, 2006). 
Some scholars claim that the effect of repression upon dissent is best approached 
through interaction models (Cunningham & Beaulieu, 2010; Francisco, 1995; Lichbach, 
1987; Moore, 1998, 2000). Dissidents adapt and alter their strategy of either violent or 
nonviolent protest, depending on the response to either from the state – also known as the 
Substitution hypothesis (Lichbach, 1987:285; Moore, 1998: 870). Dissidents apply the 
strategy met with the most accommodative responses from the government, and therefore 
repressive inconsistency by the government will lead to an escalation in dissident activity, as 
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the dissidents will achieve less policy reform when they substitute to their less effective tactic, 
and therefore they increase their efforts (Lichbach, 1987: 286). In other words, consistent 
repressive or accommodative policies reduce dissent, while inconsistency increases dissent 
(Lichbach, 1987:287). Empirical analysis has found that inconsistent state behavior 
encourages more violent dissent (Cunningham & Beaulieu, 2010: 194). 
 Several analyses have found empirical support for Sharp’s theoretical proposition of 
political jiu-jitsu – that governmental repression of dissent is followed by a backlash of 
mobilization rather than deterring the opposition (Francisco, 1995, 2004; Rasler, 1996; Sharp, 
1973: 109-110; Sutton et al., 2014). Dissidents respond to coercion both by increasing their 
efforts and by adapting their methods to avoid being targeted by repression (Francisco, 
1995:277), and backlash mobilization occurs in the event that dissidents consider the 
repression important and are able to communicate the government response to other potential 
participants (Francisco, 2004: 118-121).  
 Others have emphasized that the pre-existing campaign infrastructure influences the 
effect of repression upon dissent (McLauchlin & Pearlman, 2012; Sutton et al., 2014). 
McLauchlin and Pearlman (2012: 60) argue that repression amplifies trends in cooperation or 
conflict existent in a movement before the onset of repression, while others argue that a 
preexisting infrastructure increases the likelihood of both increased domestic mobilization and 
security defections in the aftermath of repression, while international repercussions – and 
domestic mobilization – are affected by the existence of parallel media institutions (Sutton et 
al., 2014: 9-10).  
Formal game theoretic models have provided several theoretic insights to the 
relationship between repressive governmental policy and dissent (Ginkel & Smith, 1999; 
Pierskalla, 2009; Shadmehr, 2014). Some claim that highly repressive conditions favor large, 
but few, protests because in the event that early dissidents find the status quo sufficiently 
unbearable, they demonstrate a greater resolve to the general public by mobilizing despite 
high costs of exposure, which increases the likelihood of mass mobilization (Ginkel & Smith, 
1999:301-302).  
Others argue that the perceived willingness and capacity of the state determine 
whether the dissidents will mobilize. Governments that are capable of repressing protest will 
be able to deter dissident protest in the first place. Thus, protest and the repression thereof 
stem from lack of information and skewed perceptions. In transitional or failed  regimes there 
is greater uncertainty and less reliable information about the capabilities and resolve of the 
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actors, which increases the likelihood of protest (Pierskalla, 2009: 19). In periods of 
liberalization, which can lower the cost of protest through increased freedom of assembly and 
speech, a mismatch between costs of protest and the willingness of the regime to yield may 
occur, which would lead to the repression of protest (Pierskalla, 2009: 20).  
 Shadmehr (2014) argues that the mixed empirical support for the grievance-based and 
political opportunity theories within the study of repression is because these theories – rather 
than being contradictory – are complementary, and should be unified in a single framework. 
He argues that grievances are the instigator for protest, but that dissidents also consider the 
costs and benefits of protest before mobilizing (Shadmehr, 2014: 622). While increased 
grievances increase the motivation for protest, they also raise the costs of accommodation for 
the state and thereby make repression a more likely response. Dissidents expect the state to 
repress when grievances are high, and thus will not mobilize unless the grievances are 
sufficiently high that the benefits from altering the status quo surpass the cost of being 
repressed. In other words – dissidents will protest at either extreme level of grievances, but 
will refrain from protest at intermediate levels of grievances (Shadmehr, 2014: 622).  
 
2.4 Remaining Gaps in the Literature 
The quantitative field of research on nonviolent campaigns is widely uncharted territory, and 
thus far we know very little of its origins. The research done to date suggests that there are 
fundamental differences in the causes of violent and nonviolent conflict, and that we cannot 
with certainty apply the models of civil war on nonviolent conflict.  
 The connection between repression and dissent – including nonviolent dissent – is, as 
previously shown, one of some controversy. Currently no consensus exists on the effect of 
repression on dissent. However, we do know that maximalist nonviolent campaigns tend to 
arise in highly repressive circumstances, though seldom in full autocracies (Chenoweth & 
Stephan, 2011: 67).  Several scholars have argued that liberalization of repressive regimes 
will lead to conflict (Gurr, 1968, 1970; Hegre et al., 2001; Pierskalla, 2009; Tarrow, 1998; 
Tocqueville, 1955), as grievances held by an oppressed population are allowed to surface in 
the less restrictive political climate or because the dissidents believe the liberalized regime to 
be weak (Gurr, 1970; Pierskalla, 2009; Tarrow, 1998). However, the analyses of this 
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phenomenon have been qualitative and historical in nature (Davenport, 2007a: 12), or 
predictions derived from formal models (Pierskalla, 2009).  
 Equally, predictions have been made on increased repressiveness and conflict. 
According to Gurr (1968: 1104), we should expect dissent if restrictions of political rights are 
imposed on a population, as this constitutes a grievance held by a majority of the population. 
Along the same lines, Tucker (2007) argues that electoral fraud will provide a rallying point 
for nonviolent dissent. In other words, there are theoretical arguments suggesting that both 
increased repression and liberalization should produce conflict between the state and 
dissidents – but no quantitative study has been done to support these widely held 
presumptions.  
 There are, however, studies that approximate these presumptions within the civil war 
research field. Hegre et al. (2001) established a relationship between regime transitions and 
civil war, in which both autocratization and democratization increased the probability of 
conflict. This supported the purported inverted U-shape relationship between regime type and 
conflict, suggesting that civil war is more likely in semi-democracies than in both autocracies 
and democracies (Hegre et al., 2001: 33-34). The theoretical argument behind this 
relationship is that because semi-democracies are partly open, partly repressive, this invites 
dissent through grievances created by repression, and opportunities to organize and rebel 
through openness. According to Hegre et al., it is this political incoherence that is linked to 
civil conflict, and thus drives the inverted U-relationship (Hegre et al., 2001: 33).  
 While there are notable differences between Hegre et al. (2001) and the original 
arguments of repressive instability leading to conflict, this study does at least suggest that 
there may be some merit to the hypotheses. However, the study is exclusively done on violent 
conflict. No analysis has been done on whether changes in repressiveness increase the 
likelihood of nonviolent campaigns, despite the prevalent link between repressive conditions 
and nonviolence. Furthermore, as nonviolent campaigns require mass mobilization, the 
grievances that source the revolt should presumably be inclusive to major parts of the 
population. Governmental repression is such a grievance – especially when it encompasses all 
of society. Electoral fraud, disappearances, or lack of civil liberties affect all citizens and 
should therefore provide a potential for wide-spread mobilization.  
 Thus, the research question for this thesis is does repressive instability increase the 
likelihood of nonviolent conflict? 
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2.5 Summary 
This chapter has highlighted the scholarship on nonviolent dissent, and the repression-dissent 
research to date. While extensive work has been done on the repression-dissent nexus, no 
conclusive effect of repression upon dissent has been established. The quantitative field of 
nonviolent conflict research is widely uncharted territory, and only recently have global data 
on nonviolent campaigns been available. This thesis seeks to expand this literature, as well as 
provide a contribution to the repression-dissent literature by establishing whether repressive 
instability increases the likelihood of nonviolent conflict.  
 The next chapter contains the theoretical definitions of the key concepts of this 
analysis.  
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3 Definitions and Concepts 
 
 
Making precise definitions is important, because if the theoretical concept is not sufficiently 
clear, it is not obvious what we are in fact studying. Additionally, without a clearly defined 
concept, how can we hope to assess whether our operationalizations cover the entirety – and 
nothing more – of our theoretical concept? In short, a poorly specified concept will inevitably 
lead to poor measurement validity, which in turn pulls the entire study into question (Adcock 
& Collier, 2001: 531-532).  
The research question – does repressive instability increase the likelihood of conflict -  
calls for a definition of two central concepts – repression and dissent. This chapter outlines 
the different theoretical definitions of central concepts applied in repression-dissent and 
nonviolent conflict scholarship, as well as a discussion about their applicability, before the 
definitions used in this thesis is specified. 
3.1 Dissent, Violent and Nonviolent Campaigns  
3.1.1 Defining Dissent, Social Movements and Campaigns 
Unsurprisingly, there is a plethora of definitions of civil dissent. The theoretical precision 
varies, and some are more easily applicable in quantitative analysis. This section outlines a 
few variations, and then presents the definition used by Chenoweth and Lewis (2013a: 2; 
2013d: 416), which is used in this thesis. 
 Some scholars have used typologies of dissent. Ted R. Gurr argues that political 
violence varies across three factors; scope, intensity, and duration of conflict. He proposes a 
three-category typology that includes turmoil, conspiracy, and internal war (Gurr, 1970: 11). 
While turmoil – i.e. relatively spontaneous and unorganized political violence – does 
not correspond well to the definition applied in this thesis, conspiracy – highly organized 
political violence with limited participation –, and internal war – highly organized political 
violence with widespread popular participation – might both correspond to the concept of 
major maximalist campaigns. Importantly, Gurr emphasizes maximalist tactics in internal war 
– they are intended to overthrow the regime (Gurr, 1970: 11). However, this typology does 
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not include nonviolent campaigns, nor does it offer any threshold for categorization of 
conflicts.  
Charles Tilly (1978: 7, 40) defines social movements as groups of people who share a 
common belief system and actively promote change based on their views. His definition is 
close to Paul Wilkinson’s (1971: 27) more elaborate definition:  
“… a deliberate collective endeavor to promote change in any direction and by 
any means, not excluding violence, illegality, revolution or withdrawal into 
‘utopian’ community… A social movement must evince a minimal degree of 
organization, though this may range from a loose, informal or partial level of 
organization to the highly institutionalized and bureaucratized movement and the 
corporate group… A social movement’s commitment to change and the raison 
d’être of its organization are founded upon the conscious volition, normative 
commitment to the movement’s aims or beliefs, and active participation on the 
part of the followers or members.”  
These definitions add significant important aspects to the theoretical concept of social dissent. 
First, the group must have common interests; second, they must act through nonconventional 
means to promote change; and third, some aspect of organization must be present.  
Sidney Tarrow (1998: 4) view social movements as collective challenges – or in a 
collective action perspective. The actors involved make cost-benefit analyses to evaluate their 
own participation, as does the group of actors when choosing tactics. He reiterates the 
importance of common purposes and social solidarities, but includes a third important aspect: 
sustained interaction with opponents. Tarrow distinguishes between contentious politics, 
which are essentially sporadic and unorganized, and social movements, which draw on social 
networks – i.e. are organized – and can sustain conflictual interaction with powerful 
opponents over time (Tarrow, 1998: 10, 19).  
This definition of social movements allows us to distinguish between contentious 
events and social movements that are sustained over time, as well as a distinction between 
concurrent contentious events and social movements. The social movement must be 
organized, consensual action for a common purpose over time.   
The definition used by Erica Chenoweth and Orion A. Lewis (2013a: 2) in the 
Nonviolent and Violent Campaigns and Outcomes (NAVCO) Data Project v2.0 is more 
stringent than the previously presented suggestions: “We define a campaign2 as a series of 
                                                 
2
 Note that Chenoweth and Lewis (2013a) uses the term ‘campaign’ rather than ‘social movement’. (Chenoweth 
& Lewis, 2013d: 417) 
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observable, continuous, purposive mass tactics or events in pursuit of a political objective”. In 
other words, a campaign’s tactics must be documentable and overt, sustained over an 
unspecified amount of time – though distinct from one-off events or revolts, be organized and 
directed towards achieving a common goal (Chenoweth & Lewis, 2013a: 2; 2013d: 416). 
3.1.2 Distinguishing Nonviolent and Violent Campaigns 
According to Gene Sharp, nonviolent action is characterized by nonconventional political 
action, including noncooperation, protest, and intervention, in which the dissidents do not 
threaten or cause physical harm to their opponent (Sharp, 1973: 68).  
Nonviolence does not imply inactive or passive – Sharp identified approximately 200 
nonviolent tactics, all of which are either persuasive – i.e., attempting to sway their opponent 
through demonstrations, parades and speeches; non-cooperative – i.e., refusal to aid the 
government in upholding the status quo, such as boycotts –; or disruptive – i.e., increasing the 
government’s cost of maintaining the status quo, such as strikes, sit-ins and the like (Sharp, 
1973: 68-69). In other words, nonviolent tactics can be acts of omission, acts of commission, 
and combinations of both (Chenoweth & Stephan, 2011: 12). 
To summarize, nonviolent campaigns
3
 are sustained interactions between 
government and an organized opposition over some political contention, in which the 
dissidents purposively apply active nonconventional tactics that do not threaten or cause 
physical harm to their opponents to achieve their stated goal (Chenoweth & Lewis, 2013a: 
418; 2013d-13; Chenoweth & Stephan, 2011: 3; Sharp, 1973: 68-69).  
Violent campaigns differ from nonviolent campaigns in tactics. Both types of 
campaigns are the concerted efforts of civilians to change the status quo which the 
government attempts to maintain, over time. Violent campaigns, however, are waged by 
armed dissidents that can draw from a wide range of violent actions and tactics – e.g., 
bombings, shootings, physical sabotage and so on (Chenoweth & Stephan, 2011: 13). In other 
words, a violent campaign is characterized by the use of physical force – either through 
threats or through concrete physical action – to coerce the opponent by physical means 
(Chenoweth & Lewis, 2013a: 3). 
                                                 
3
 The term ‘campaign’ is used rather than ‘conflict’ to annotate the unilateral choice of strategy implied. While 
‘nonviolent conflict’ could be construed as nonviolent on parts of both dissidents and government, this is 
frequently not the case. Therefore, campaign is used to underline that the tactics of nonviolence or violence is on 
the part of the dissidents.  
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Note that the campaign types outlined here are ideals – in practice dissidents may 
apply a combination of tactics, change their tactical approach over the course of the 
campaign, and nonviolent and violent campaigns may occur simultaneously, or predominately 
nonviolent campaigns may experience radical flanks of violence – or vice versa. However, we 
can usually distinguish the primary modus operandi of a campaign, and as such the ideal types 
can be recognized in a more confounded reality. Nevertheless, it is important to recognize that 
these ideals are a simplification of a complex reality (Chenoweth & Lewis, 2013a: 3; 
2013d:418-419). 
 
3.2 Repression – Coercion and Deterrence 
 
Although the field of repression studies is not exactly barren, few scholars spend a sufficient 
amount of time clearly defining the concept of political repression. This section will present 
some of the definitions available before presenting the definition used in this thesis.  
Charles Tilly describes repression as “…any action by another group which raises the 
contender’s cost of collective action” (Tilly, 1978: 100). Similarly, Alan Wolfe (1973: 6) 
defines repression as “a process by which those in power try to keep themselves in power by 
consciously attempting to destroy or render harmless organizations and ideologies that 
threaten their power”. Though both definitions are admirably concise and parsimonious, the 
concept of repression is infinitely more complex and convoluted (Earl, 2011: 263; Goldstein, 
1978: xvi).  
First, neither definition differentiates between government repression and private actor 
repression. Second, both descriptions remains agnostic with regards to chronology – does 
repression predate collective action, or is it merely reactive? Third, no restriction is put upon 
the types of acts that are considered repression. If all acts that raise the cost of collective 
action – or render harmless organizations and ideologies –  are considered repressive acts, 
several governmental actions we consider to be ‘normal’ governmental policy could be 
included – such as policing, propagating the governmental politics, etcetera. Fourth, there are 
no distinctions between types of repression and their purposes – are all repressive acts the 
same?  
Goldstein (1978: xvi) argues that the definition provided by Wolfe (1973: 6) is 
underspecified, specifically with regards to the powerholder as the government, and which 
acts are deemed to be repression, and presents his own:  
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“Political repression consists of government action which grossly discriminates 
against persons or organizations viewed as presenting a fundamental challenge to 
existing power relationships or key policies, because of their perceived political 
beliefs.”  
This conceptualization specifies that the government is the perpetrator of repression, and that 
acts of repression constitute gross discrimination on the basis of perceived beliefs of 
individuals or organizations. Goldstein further emphasizes that government action which 
applies to all persons and that are done in the presence of a ‘clear and present danger’ does 
not constitute repression (1978: xx). Davenport (2007a: 2) includes threats of physical 
sanctions as repression, as well as specifying the territorial boundaries of repression: 
“… repression involves the actual or threatened use of physical sanctions against 
an individual or organization, within the territorial jurisdiction of the state, for the 
purpose of imposing a cost on the target as well as deterring specific activities 
and/or beliefs perceived to be challenging to government personnel, practices or 
institutions.” 
Additionally, Davenport (2007a: 2) also notes that though repression is a form of coercion, it 
is not concerned with all coercive behaviors – such as the punishment and deterrence of theft 
or murder. In other words, repression is coercive behavior extraneous to the ‘conventional’ 
coercive properties of government.  
 Furthermore, this definition does not specify that repression as a direct response to 
dissidents, nor that any law or norm must be violated – both of which have been common in 
the literature (e.g., protest policing in Earl 2003 and human rights violations in Poe & Tate 
1994). This makes for a broader and more inclusive definition (Davenport, 2007a: 3).  
This definition also includes the duality of repression – the purpose of imposing costs 
on the target in the event of certain behavior, and the purpose of deterring specific behavior 
and/or beliefs. Others have also suggested similar distinctions to the concept of repression.  
 Snyder (1976: 285-287) proposes a useful distinction between ‘preemptive’ and 
‘responsive’ repression, wherein preemptive repression signifies repressive and oppressive 
policies by government that are designed to prevent dissent in the absence of dissident action, 
while responsive repression is a reaction to the event of dissent. Karen Rasler (1996: 138) 
defines repression as “… the actions taken to coercively mobilize the opposition.” This is 
clearly within the bounds of what Snyder dubbed responsive repression.  
Sutton et al. (2014: 4) classifies repression as governmental communicative action 
directed at three separate audiences – the dissidents, the inactive population, and the regime’s 
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supporters. Their definition implies both reactive and proactive properties at the same time; 
repression is intended to convince dissidents that the cost of continued opposition is higher 
than that of compliance, and at the same time communicate to the inactive population that the 
cost of joining the dissidents is higher than compliance with the status quo. This is fairly 
similar to the one proposed by Davenport (2007a). 
The definition applied by Sutton et al. (2014) includes both deterrence and coercion as 
mechanisms of repression. Correspondingly, Oliver (2008: 14) identifies three separate – 
though linked – mechanisms of repression: deterrence, incapacitation, and surveillance. 
Deterrent repression works through threat of punishment for a certain class of acts – and is 
successful when the threat persuades the populace to avoid that sort of actions. Incapacitation 
is preventive, and occurs when people are removed from the system before they have 
committed the undesirable acts. Coercive surveillance works by gaining information about the 
populace to identify possible protesters.  
According to Oliver, only deterrence is target-specific – the threat is directed at certain 
actions, and the threat is executed when the action is performed. Incapacitation and 
surveillance are less precise, and in certain respects more random and society-wide – the 
identification of possible dissenters and the incapacitation of said would-be dissenters predate 
the crime, and some pretext is often posed (Oliver, 2008: 14).  
This thesis will rely heavily on the definition proposed by (Davenport, 2007a), but 
with an important distinction. Because the primary goal of this analysis is to investigate the 
link between changes in repressive levels of a government and civil conflict, the concept of 
deterrent or preemptive repression is most interesting. However, because governments are 
thought to repress more in response to perceived threats – meaning that there may or may not 
be any real threat – we cannot necessarily isolate the two theoretical concepts. Nevertheless, it 
is still useful to distinguish between them for the purpose of highlighting the causal direction. 
Thus, the definition of repression for this analysis is the actual or threatened use of 
force and physical sanctions by government against an individual or organization, 
within the territorial jurisdiction of the state, to ensure quiescence, to coerce the target 
by imposing costs on specific undesired behavior, or to deter undesired behavior and/or 
beliefs perceived to be challenging to government personnel, practices or institutions 
(Davenport, 2007a; Oliver, 2008; Snyder, 1976; Sutton et al., 2014; Tilly, 1978). 
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3.2.1 Willingness, Ability, and Behavior 
Coercion and deterrence as governmental behaviors are not exclusive to intrastate conditions. 
In International Relations scholarship has produced frameworks for the efficiency of interstate 
coercive diplomacy directly relevant for repression research. In IR theory, deterrence is the 
proactive use of threats to influence the adversary to avoid certain undesired actions in the 
first place. Coercion is the reactive threats, and use, of limited force in the face of undesired 
actions. Both in both cases, the objective is to avoid the use of force, but rather elicit 
compliance based on the threat of force (Jakobsen, 2013: 241). Thomas C. Schelling argues 
that in order to successfully deter or coerce, the threat must be sufficient and credible – in 
other words, the adversary must believe that the cost of noncompliance is higher than that of 
compliance, and that the coercer is both willing and able to impose those costs should he not 
yield (Jakobsen, 2013: 245; Schelling, 2008 [1966]: 339). 
This insight is relevant to the definition of repression because it highlights two 
essential elements of repressive behavior. First, the regime must be able to impose costs that 
are sufficient, and second, it must be willing to do so. The regime’s attitude and policy 
towards limiting the liberties and infringing on the integrities of their citizens will directly 
influence the extent of repressive behavior. A government that is held accountable by its 
citizenry will, presumably, be less inclined to adopt repressive policies of either type – which, 
regardless of their capabilities, will limit their repressive behavior. Likewise, a government’s 
lack of capabilities may restrict its repressive behavior, in spite of willingness to repress. The 
institutional and organizational power must be present in order to execute the extensive 
surveillance, and physical policing, required to implement repressive policies. Thus, the 
actual behavior of the regime is a function of the willingness and capabilities of repression it 
possesses.  
3.2.2 Civil Liberties and Personal Integrity 
The concept of political repression proposed here encompasses a wide variety of tactics, such 
as domestic surveillance, physical and verbal harassment, as well as political bans and 
prohibitions. The literature has divided these tactics into two types of repression; civil 
liberties repression and personal integrity repression (Davenport, 2007a: 2; 2007b: 487).  
Civil liberties repression corresponds to what Davenport (2007a: 2) and Goldstein 
(1978: xviii-xxi) call state infringement of First Amendment-type rights, such as freedom of 
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assembly, expression, association, and beliefs (Davenport, 2007b: 487). In other words, civil 
liberties repression constitutes state activity that limits or restricts, for instance, the civilian 
population’s political participation, expression and beliefs, as well as the freedom of press, the 
freedom of travel, and the freedom to boycott, peacefully picket, or strike (Davenport, 2007a: 
2).  
Personal integrity violations involve governmental activities that directly interfere 
with the physical integrity, survival and safety of the civilian population, including (but not 
limited to) torture, disappearances, extrajudicial execution, mass killings, etcetera 
(Davenport, 2007a: 2; 2007b: 487). In other words, personal integrity repression corresponds 
well to the idea of political terror; the basic right of physical security is being infringed upon 
by the government.  
Figure 1 depicts the relationships between the different definitions of repression 
outlined in this chapter. Repressive actions are categorized by their strategic aim, specificity 
with regards to target, timing and method, and the mechanism at play. Note that the 
categories proposed by Goldstein (1978),  Davenport (2007a, 2007b), and Oliver (2008) span 
across the categories defined by Snyder (1976). This highlights the communicative effect 
proposed by Sutton et al. (2014) – coercive and targeted repression has a deterrent effect as 
well. While we can make theoretical distinctions between coercive, target-specific, responsive 
repression and deterrent, diffused, preemptive repression, the successful application of the 
former will produce the latter. 
Nevertheless, the distinction between preemptive and responsive repression is 
theoretically salient and significant. For the purposes of this analysis, we are most concerned 
with the governmental preemptive attempts to dissuade dissident behavior, while 
acknowledging that perceived threats may at times be real, but repressed efficiently and 
therefore not distinguishable in the widespread repressive state of the regime.  
3.2.3 Repressive Change 
For the purposes of this thesis, I will use the term liberalization to denote decreased 
repression, and autocratization to denote increased repression. I remark on this to avoid 
confusion with the democratization literature – I do not refer to changes in institutional polity, 
but to the increase or decrease in repression.  
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Table 1 Typologies of Repression 
Strategy Deterrent Coercive 
Specificity 
Diffused Target-specific 
Timing and 
method 
(Snyder, 1976: 
287) 
Preemptive 
nonviolence 
Preemptive 
violence 
Responsive 
violence 
Responsive 
nonviolence 
Action 
 
(Davenport, 
2007a: 2-3; 
Goldstein, 1978: 
xviii-xxi) 
 
 
(Davenport, 
2007b: 487) 
 
 
 Violations of 
First 
Amendment-
type rights 
 Due process 
transgressions 
 
Civil liberty 
restrictions 
 
 
 Personal 
integrity 
violations 
 Due process 
transgressions 
 
Personal 
integrity 
violations 
 
 
 Personal 
integrity 
violations 
 Due process 
transgressions 
 
Personal 
integrity 
violations 
 
 
 Violations of 
First 
Amendment-
type rights 
 Due process 
transgressions 
 
Civil liberty 
restriction 
Mechanism 
(Oliver, 2008:14) 
 
Incapacitation, 
surveillance 
 
Incapacitation 
 
Deterrence 
 
Deterrence 
 
Note: Coercive strategies will contain an element of deterrence, if the cost associated with the action 
is sufficient. Repressive responses by government are communication to all audiences, not only the 
dissidents it reacts to – and thus both coercive and deterrent (Sutton et al., 2014:4). 
 
 
3.3 Summary 
This chapter has defined the most important concepts employed in this thesis. Nonviolent 
campaigns are sustained interactions between government and an organized opposition over 
some political contention, in which the dissidents purposively apply active nonconventional 
tactics that do not threaten or cause physical harm to their opponents to achieve their stated 
goal. Violent campaigns are sustained interactions between government and an armed 
organized opposition over some political contention, in which the dissidents purposively 
threaten or cause physical harm to their opponents to achieve their stated goal.  
Repression is the actual or threatened use of force and physical sanctions by 
government agents against an individual or organization, within the territorial jurisdiction of 
the state, to ensure quiescence, to coerce the target by imposing costs on specific undesired 
  
 
28 
 
behavior, or to deter undesired behavior and/or beliefs perceived to be challenging to 
government personnel, practices or institutions. Preemptive repression signifies 
governmental transgressions against personal integrity or restrictions of civil liberties that 
occur in the absence of open or prevalent dissent, are diffused across the civilian population, 
and intended to deter dissidence.  
The next chapter will outline the theoretical foundation for this analysis, and the 
proposed relationship between repression and nonviolent and violent campaigns outlined in 
the research question - does repressive instability increase the likelihood of nonviolent 
conflict? 
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4 Theoretical Framework 
 
 
This chapter outlines the theoretical foundation of the analysis. Two conflict theories are 
presented; grievance theory and the political opportunity structure approach. Theoretical 
issues related to repression research and these theories are sketched out, before the integrated 
approach used in this thesis is described. Finally, the theoretical arguments for the hypotheses 
are presented before each hypothesis.  
4.1  Internal Conflict, Grievance Theory, and 
Political Opportunity Structures 
Internal conflict is conflict between the government and its population, in which opponents of 
the state use collective action to seek redress for their grievances through nonconventional 
means. The main focus of this thesis is maximalist violent and nonviolent campaigns. Both 
violent and nonviolent campaigns work through collective action, which means that the 
dissidents must have a common purpose and be aware of this fact, they must be able to 
mobilize others to their cause, and finally they must be able to act against their opponent – the 
regime.  
Two existing theories of civil conflict propose to explain how dissent occurs within a 
polity; grievance theory argues that prevalent and intense grievances cause the deprived 
population to rise up against the regime (Gurr, 1968, 1970); political opportunity structure 
(POS) approaches argue that openings within the political structure of a polity create 
opportunities that the aggrieved dissidents exploit to mount their protest (McAdam & Tarrow, 
2000; McAdam, Tarrow, & Tilly, 2004; Tarrow, 1998). In the following paragraphs, both 
theoretical approaches will be presented, before the integrated approach applied in this thesis 
is sketched out. 
4.1.1 Grievance Theory 
Grievance theory scholars argue that the origin of all conflict lie in the grievances held by the 
citizenry against the state (Davies, 1962; Gurr, 1968, 1970).  Ted R. Gurr suggests that the 
grievances arise through the psychological mechanism of relative deprivation – i.e. the 
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discrepancy between the value an actor believes he should be able to attain, and the value he 
is in fact capable of attaining. Disequilibrium in this value calculus produces discontent and 
frustration, which – if it exceeds constraining social conditions – produces participation in 
social strife (Gurr, 1968: 1104; 1970: 13). 
 Societal conditions that increase value expectancies without increasing value 
capabilities can produce an intensification of the perception of relative deprivation – as can 
societal conditions which decrease the value capabilities without addressing value 
expectancies (Gurr, 1970: 13). Such changes in the value calculus cause disequilibrium, 
which intensify the perceived relative deprivation (Gurr, 1970: 46). 
The discontent produced by relative deprivation is politically salient only if it is 
directed at the government, shared among a relatively large part of the population, and fairly 
intense. The potential for political conflict then, according to Gurr, lies in the intensity and 
extent of this shared discontent within the population of a society, for which the citizens 
blame their government (Gurr, 1970: 8). Thus, the general argument is that the greater the 
grievance, the greater the likelihood of conflict (Gurr, 1970: 9).  
Importantly, relative deprivation differs from absolute deprivation in its comparison 
with an ideal – the importance is placed on a perception of deprivation relative to the expected 
value to which the individual believes he is entitled. Thus the mechanism may be in play even 
if an actor is not living in conditions of absolute deprivation – and equally, may not occur in 
actors despite their deprived state (Gurr, 1970: 24).  
4.1.2 Political Opportunity Structure 
The political opportunity literature (Collier & Hoeffler, 2004; McAdam, 1999; McAdam, 
McCarthy, & Zald, 1996; McAdam & Tarrow, 2000; McAdam et al., 2004; Meyer, 2004; 
Tarrow, 1998; Tilly, 1978) holds that grievances, though not insignificant, are a constant 
factor of society and therefore not able to explain the solution of the collective action problem 
of civil unrest. Rather, the political opportunities in the context in which movements emerge 
determine whether or not the grievances will result in conflict. In other words, because 
grievances often exist and persist without the eruption of open conflict, these cannot be the 
explanans of dissidence. According to these scholars, the precursory condition to political 
conflict is an opening in the political opportunity structure of the polity (Collier & Hoeffler, 
2004: 563; Tarrow, 1998: 71). 
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 Heavily influenced by collective action-scholarship (Olson, 1965) and rational choice 
research, this strand of the literature argues that dissidents are rational actors who, when 
aggrieved by government, gauges the contextual opportunities in order to choose the best 
strategy. If the political opportunities are not conducive mobilization is unlikely, and the 
collective action problem of civil unrest cannot be resolved. Conflict arises, not because 
grievances have changed, but because the structure of opportunities and constraints of the 
polity has changed (Tarrow, 1998: 19). 
 Political opportunities are changes in the polity that enable dissent such as institutional 
access, elite discord, new allies, or reduced state capacity (Tarrow, 1998: 20, 71). Conversely, 
political constraints are factors that discourage dissent by increasing costs, such as 
governmental repressive capacity and will, institutional control, as well as the capacity to 
present a unified front to the dissidents (Tarrow, 1998: 20). The removal of constraints can 
also be viewed as an opportunity. 
 In their analysis of the feasibility of civil war, Collier et al. (2009: 23-25) imply a 
dual-axis to the political opportunity structure – the feasibility of rebellion is determined both 
by the capabilities of the state, as well as its willingness to militarily deter dissidence. This 
corresponds well to Tarrow’s description of repression as political constraints, and to the 
definition of repression in section 3.2.1. The description of repression as a constraining 
feature of the political system determined by both the willingness and capability of the state 
calls to mind the importance of credibility for successful coercive strategies, highlighted by 
IR theory. Likewise, the feasibility of rebellion – or the opportunity for dissidence – is 
determined by a function of the state’s willingness and capability of repression.  
4.2 The Problem of Repression 
This thesis seeks to expand the literature on the effects of repression upon dissent. However, 
pinpointing the direction of the effect of repression upon conflict has proven difficult (Earl, 
2011: 267) (see Chapter 2, paragraph 2.4.2).  Several answers have been proposed, countless 
analyses have been done – and yet the repression-dissent nexus remains unexplained. An 
inspection of the two theories presented previously indicates why; repression is predicted to 
have at least two contradictory effects; as a grievance which incites conflict [grievance 
theory] and as a constraint of the political system which discourages collective action [POS].  
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 Both civil liberty repression and personal integrity repression could credibly be 
viewed as a grievance for an individual. Gurr (1970: 25) defines three types of values 
especially relevant to a theory of political conflict; welfare values, interpersonal values, and 
power values.   
Power values are related to an individual’s ability to influence, and avoid unwanted 
interference from, others. Both types of repression affect power values. Civil liberty 
repression limits the freedom of speech, right of assembly, and suffrage – among other things 
– which corresponds well to Gurr’s specification: “(…) the desire to participate in collective 
decision-making – to vote, to take part in political competition, to become a member of the 
political elite (…)”. The second part of his definition of power values – desires for self-
determination and security – corresponds well to the goods and conditions personal integrity 
repression targets through such tactics as terror, disappearances, and torture (Gurr, 1970: 26).  
Thus, one simplified implication of governmental repression is a discrepancy between 
an ideal power value expectancy of participation and security and the reality of the value 
capabilities in the repressive regime in which one lives. The discontent is quite obviously 
politicized, as the repression is a feature of the polity – an aspect of government. Because 
repressive acts most often are performed by government officials, the regime is likely held 
responsible by the population. Furthermore, it is likely, in highly repressive regimes, that 
most of the population feels the effect of repression – either through coercion or deterrence. 
This makes the grievance widely dispersed throughout the population.  
 However, repression can also credibly be considered a constraining feature of the 
political structure – Tarrow specifically mentions repression as a typical political constraint 
(Tarrow, 1998: 20). Repression discourages collective action, which presumably is the 
rationale of the government employing the tactic. According to Tarrow, repression can work 
in two ways; either through violent suppression of dissidents – i.e. through infringement on 
their personal integrity, or through increasing the costs of mobilization and organization for 
the dissidents – i.e. through limiting the civil liberties afforded them (Tarrow, 1998: 83). 
 The difficulty in pinpointing the exact effect of repression within repression literature 
is unsurprising when the two theoretical approaches propose widely different and opposing 
effects of repression. Gurr (1970: 15) concedes that a governmental monopoly of coercive 
capability could limit the effects of grievances for an extended period of time, yet the relative 
deprivation felt as a result of the repression should produce conflict at some point. 
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Conversely, Tarrow views repression solely as constraints which deters or increases costs of 
collective action (Tarrow, 1998: 20).  
4.3 A Grievance-Opportunity Approach 
Both grievance theory and POS approaches have had conflicting evidence in empirical 
studies, and been the subject of harsh criticism (Alimi, 2009; Chenoweth & Ulfelder, 2015; 
Collier & Hoeffler, 2004; Collier et al., 2009; Earl, 2011; Fearon & Laitin, 2003; Meyer, 
2004). In a review of the political opportunity structure literature, Meyer (2004: 131) 
concludes that the premises derived from the political process approach “(…) generally do not 
perform well”. Grievance theory has fared no better – a plethora of analyses has discredited 
the hypothesis that increased grievances lead to more dissent and conflict (Collier & Hoeffler, 
2004; Collier et al., 2009; Fearon & Laitin, 2003). The two approaches to conflict research 
are, however, still applied within current scholarship, perhaps due to their intuitive premises. 
Although they are often presented as conflicting theories, they are not fundamentally 
opposing. Grievances and political opportunities may not be as distinct as is implied by 
viewing these two theories as disparate. In fact, it seems that the features of a political system 
may be both the source of grievance and a constraint or opportunity, such as repression or the 
economic conditions of a state. The conditions of a society would necessarily inform the 
grievances of its populace, but they may also limit the possibility for rebellion. Following 
Shadmehr (2014), this thesis also calls for an integration of grievance theory and POS 
approaches. According to Shadmehr (2014: 625), the resulting theoretical argument is that:   
“(…) grievances provide the incentive to perform collective action; however, in 
their ‘calculus of protest’, actors also account for the costs and likelihood of 
success, which are determined by factors such as available resources and political 
opportunity structure.” 
This is fairly close to the theoretical arguments presented by both Gurr and Tarrow. While 
Gurr argues that grievances are the basic instigator to conflict, he concedes that politicized 
discontent can be prevalent and persistent without producing open conflict if the regime is 
strong and monopolizes coercive control (Gurr, 1970: 15). In other words, even if grievances 
are intense and widespread, the political structure may prevent conflict. Likewise, Tarrow 
does not deny the importance of grievances – in fact he emphasizes the importance of 
common purposes in the pursuit of collective action. In his own words;  “People do not risk 
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their skins or sacrifice their time to social movement activity unless they have a good reason 
to do so” (Tarrow, 1998: 6). 
 Furthermore, both approaches argue that it is changes in the status quo that increases 
the likelihood of conflict. As described, Tarrow (1998: 20) proposes changes in the political 
opportunity structure as the instigation to conflict.  Gurr (1970: 46) argues that changes in the 
value calculus cause disequilibrium and thus intensification of discontent, which can result in 
conflict.  
Because collective action requires both motive and opportunity, and all internal 
conflicts are cases of collective action, it is my argument that it is not a case of either 
grievance or opportunity structure as the root cause, but rather changes in either set of 
variables. Conflict is based on a function of the two, but the instigating factor is change in 
either.  
 The argument is fairly intuitive. The population must have both a motive for revolt, as 
well as the opportunity to do so. Grievance theory faces the problem of conflicts that do not 
arise in situations where population is clearly deprived, and should by all premises of the 
theory revolt. The POS approach struggles more with defining clearly its premises, as the 
concept of political opportunity has become something of a ‘catch-all’ in which almost 
everything is construed as elements of the political structure (Meyer, 2004: 128). An 
integrated approach, in which changes in both the value calculus of individuals, and changes 
in the political opportunity structure are considered should allow more specified explanations, 
as well as ameliorate these problems. 
 The next section will discuss how an integrated approach may help illuminate the 
repression-dissent nexus, and possibly explain why repression has had both negative and 
positive effects on conflict in previous research. 
4.4 Repression Revisited – the Hypotheses 
The problem statement of this thesis – does repressive instability increase the likelihood of 
conflict – calls for a theoretical foundation that allows for both the negative and positive 
effect of repression upon dissent. This thesis proposes that repression, rather intuitively, can 
both be a grievance and a constraining factor of the political opportunity structure. Thus, the 
effect of repression upon dissent is controversial precisely because of this fact – sometimes it 
is the grievance that spurs protest, and in other situations it is the constraining feature of 
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society which discourages collective action. By considering the changes in repression rather 
than the concept as a static, the different characters of repression may better be illuminated.  
 Several scholars have proposed the thesis that liberalization of repressive regimes will 
result in popular revolt. The argument is, in essence, one relating to POS; when a regime has 
oppressed its population over a long period of time, there have surely been grievances but no 
opportunity to address them. When the despot releases some of his hold over the population, 
he allows them the opportunity to rise up against them – which they surely will.  
 Alexis de Tocqueville famously described the situation thus, 
“Only consummate statecraft can enable a King to save his throne when after a 
long spell of oppressive rule he sets to improve the lot of his subjects. Patiently 
endured for so long as it seemed beyond redress, a grievance comes to appear 
intolerable once the possibility of removing it crosses men’s minds.” 4 
 (Tocqueville, 1955: 177) 
Essentially, the argument is that the opening of the political opportunity structure through 
lessened repression of the general public – for instance through increased suffrage, rights of 
assembly, or freedom of speech – allows the aggrieved population an occasion to discuss their 
discontent more freely
5
. This allows both the discovery of allies as well as ability to mobilize 
in larger groups with less consequences and costs. In other words, the cost-benefit analysis of 
each individual for participation in protest is changed favorably towards dissent.  
Thus, the central hypothesis of the thesis is:  
 
H1: Liberalization of repression opens the opportunity structure, which allows the 
aggrieved populace to address longstanding grievances, and thus increases the 
likelihood of conflict onset.  
 
                                                 
4
 This quote is the origin of the title of this thesis, albeit in another translation. The inspirational translation, 
beginning “Only a great genius can save a prince who undertakes to relieve his subjects after a long oppression 
(…)” can be found in Why Men Rebel by Ted R. Gurr (1970), p. 117.  
5
 Gurr (1970: 15, 117) also notes the same relationship – intense and widespread grievances may be checked by 
expansive governmental repression, but if the regime’s control is weakened, conflict will erupt. If the aggrieved 
and oppressed populace is promised improved conditions only to find that they are not, in fact, improved, the 
grievance is intensified and results in revolt against the regime (Gurr, 1970: 118). He argues that weakening 
regimes will be more susceptible to revolt because they are forced to impose intermediate sanctions, which will 
expose them to both the new grievances caused by the changed behavior, as well as accumulated hostility of the 
more severe previous repressive acts (Gurr, 1970: 244). Gurr dubs the mechanism at play ‘aspirational 
deprivation’, wherein the populace’s value capabilities remain stable, while the value expectations increase 
(Gurr, 1970: 46). 
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Note that this hypothesis assumes some degree of repression at the outset. However, theory 
suggests that if the regime is extremely repressive, liberalization may have a stronger effect 
than if it is only moderately repressive. Tarrow argues that it is in non-democracies that newly 
opened access is most likely to lead to conflict – the disastrous consequences of the glasnost 
and perestroika policies of the USSR President Mikhail Gorbachev a stark example (Tarrow, 
1998: 74-78). While the shifts in the repressive policy of the government may seem minor, 
any opening in severely repressive systems may signal an opportunity to dissidents, and 
convince them that their opponent is weakening (Tarrow, 1998: 78). 
Finally, in repressive regimes, the aggrieved citizenry is more likely to find unity 
against an oppressive regime. The repression that affects large parts of the population yokes 
separate groups together. In addition, the absence of channels of expression leads even 
moderate dissidents toward maximalist claims, according to Tarrow (1998: 85). Together, 
these effects of authoritarian repressiveness turn trickles of contention into floods (Tarrow, 
1998: 83). 
 Thus, a second, expanded hypothesis is proposed:  
 
H2: When highly repressive states experience a liberalization of their repressive 
policies the opened opportunity structure allows for longstanding grievances to be 
addressed through dissent and they experience a higher likelihood of major 
maximalist campaign onset than do less repressive states experiencing 
liberalization.  
 
These theoretical arguments are agnostic as to what form of conflict the liberalizing regime 
will face. Theoretically, an opening can be utilized both for nonviolent and violent campaigns. 
However, certain features of nonviolent conflict may guide theory towards a more specific 
hypothesis.  
First, maximalist nonviolent campaigns require consistent and sustained mass 
mobilization {Chenoweth, 2013 #109;Chenoweth, 2013 #6;Chenoweth, 2011 #4;Dahl, 2014 
#180}.  If the society in which the grievance is held is so constrictive that the dissenters have 
no ability to mobilize the masses, it is unlikely that maximalist nonviolent campaigns can 
occur. This is not to say that nonviolent campaigns do not occur within highly repressive 
polities – in fact they are, as noted, most prevalent in non-democracies. The difference 
between impromptu protests and general unrest and nonviolent campaigns is organization and 
directed effort towards a goal. If the regime in which the grievance is held is extremely 
oppressive to the extent that it is impossible to effectively organize, or if no institutions or 
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organized communities exist for the dissidents to co-opt, mounting a large nonviolent 
campaign would be very difficult, indeed. This is reflected by the low relative number of 
maximalist nonviolent campaigns in full autocracies (Chenoweth & Stephan, 2011: 67-68). 
Violent campaigns do not require mass mobilization to this extent. Political violent 
campaigns, like nonviolent campaigns, require a common grievance, the means to protest 
violently, and the ability to mobilize – but relatively small groups can disrupt polities through 
violence, through such tactics as acts of terror, guerrilla warfare, and so on {Dahl, 2014 
#180}.  
While the repression of personal integrity certainly raises the cost for each individual 
to participate in protest through fear for his own security, it is likely that repression of civil 
liberties is more effective in restricting mobilization (Tarrow, 1998: 83). Because 
mobilization is especially important for nonviolent campaigns, it is credible that these types of 
campaigns will be more likely when the decline in repression concerns civil liberties. Thus, it 
is probable that nonviolent conflict onset is affected positively by a liberalization of civil 
liberties:  
 
H3: Liberalization of civil liberties increases the likelihood of nonviolent conflict 
onset relative to no conflict onset.  
 
Given the theoretical arguments that highly repressive regimes are more likely to experience 
conflict after liberalization, this hypothesis too should be expanded to include this condition: 
 
H4: Highly repressive regimes that liberalize civil liberties are more likely to 
experience nonviolent conflict onset than less repressive regimes experiencing 
liberalization of civil liberties.  
 
While declining repression leading to conflict is essentially a POS-derived argument, 
increasing repression leading to conflict is not. Following the POS approach, autocratization 
should lead to a lower likelihood of conflict, because the opportunity structure is constricted. 
This is therefore the fifth hypothesis:  
 
H5: Autocratization reduces the likelihood of conflict onset.  
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However, this hypothesis may not be sufficiently specific to capture the POS argument. While 
repression is viewed as a constraining factor of the political opportunity structure, no linear 
argument is made. Tarrow does not mention at what level repression should reduce the 
likelihood of conflict, nor does he posit the effects of autocratization directly. Therefore, I 
include an amended hypothesis thought to capture the ‘repression as constraint’-argument 
better: 
 
H6: Autocratization toward extreme repression decreases the likelihood of 
conflict onset.  
 
If the ‘repression as constraint’-argument is taken at face value, increased repression should 
decrease the likelihood of conflict because the room for mobilization is restricted, even in a 
relatively open polity where the opportunity to express concerns is present. However, a 
grievance-based view would argue that increasing governmental repressive activity would 
increase the likelihood of conflict. The value calculus of the populace is changed when 
repressive policies are introduced into a relatively open polity. Gurr describes ‘decremental 
disequilibrium’ as a situation where the citizenry’s value expectations remain relatively stable 
while value capabilities are perceived to decline (Gurr, 1970: 46).  
 In a situation where the state is fairly open and the citizens enjoy a high degree of civil 
liberties and personal integrity, a decrease in these rights and conditions could easily trigger 
such disequilibrium, and thereby increase the perceived relative deprivation of the collective 
(Gurr, 1970: 46). Importantly, the comparison is made to their past condition. As Gurr puts it, 
“Men ordinarily expect to keep what they have; they also generally have a set of expectations 
and demands about what they should have in the future, which is usually as much or more 
than what they have at present” (Gurr, 1970: 27). If they suddenly find their value capabilities 
in terms of power values reduced, it is probable that they would react with frustration.  
 Finally, as previously stated, deprivation is relevant to political conflict insofar as 
many people experience the same discontent (Gurr, 1970: 29). While certain groups may 
experience deprivation, a large conflict requires a large part of the population to perceive the 
same deprivation. It is likely that imposed repressive policies by a government, such as 
disappearances, state violence or limitation of civil liberties, should provoke large parts of a 
populace. When this is combined with a relatively open polity, the following hypothesis is 
proposed: 
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H7: When repression increases in liberal regimes, this produces grievances which 
through the relatively open opportunity structure can be addressed and thus result 
in a higher likelihood of conflict onset. 
 
Thus, the integrated grievance-opportunity framework has yielded seven hypotheses relating 
repression and dissent to be tested. The next chapter will outline the research design for this 
endeavor.  
4.5 Summary 
This chapter has presented two of the most influential theories of social conflict – grievance 
theory and political opportunity structure (POS) approaches, and proposed a combined 
theoretical framework based on the two. Seven hypotheses were derived from the resultant 
theory.  
 The next chapter presents the research design constructed to test the hypotheses 
quantitatively, including the dataset, operationalizations of the variables, statistical model, and 
methodological concerns related to the decisions made in the research design. 
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5  Research Design 
 
This chapter describes the research design of the thesis. First, the dataset is presented, 
including the operationalization of the dependent variable, and potential issues and limitation 
related to the data on nonviolent conflict onset. Third, the statistical model is outlined, 
including the motivation for the choice of model, the independent variables, and the control 
variables included in the analysis. In this section, a discussion of issues relating to data 
unavailability is included, before the specifications of the independent variables are described. 
Finally, the key methodological concerns pertinent to this analysis will be discussed, before 
the descriptive statistics are presented.  
5.1 Dependent Variables and Dataset 
The dataset for this analysis is based on the dataset produced by Charles Butcher and Isak 
Svensson (2014)
6
. It comprises yearly data for all independent states between 1976 and 2006, 
and the unit of analysis is country-year. The dependent variable – campaign onset as coded by 
Butcher and Svensson (2014: 9) – is based on the Nonviolent and Violent Campaign and 
Outcomes (NAVCO) Dataset 2.0 (Chenoweth & Lewis, 2013b).  
The research question of this thesis asks whether repressive instability increases the 
likelihood of conflict. The hypotheses of Chapter 4 specify conflict as major nonviolent or 
violent maximalist campaigns, and thus the dependent variable of this analysis is the onset of 
major nonviolent or violent campaigns with maximalist goals.  
 In Chapter 3, nonviolent campaigns were defined as sustained interactions between 
government and an organized opposition over some political contention, in which the 
dissidents purposively apply active nonconventional tactics that do not threaten or cause 
physical harm to their opponents to achieve their stated goal. Violent campaigns were 
described as sustained interactions between government and an armed organized opposition 
over some political contention, in which the dissidents purposively threaten or cause physical 
harm to their opponents to achieve their stated goal.  
                                                 
6
 The codebook and replication data for “Manufacturing Dissent: Modernization and the Onset of Major 
Nonviolent Resistance Campaigns” (2014) by Charles Butcher and Isak Svensson are available at 
jcr.sagepub.com/.  
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To operationalize these concepts, the data from the Nonviolent and Violent Campaign 
and Outcomes (NAVCO) Dataset 2.0 (Chenoweth & Lewis, 2013b) is utilized, because it is 
the single most comprehensive, and global, dataset of major maximalist nonviolent and 
violent campaigns presently. It is the second iteration of the NAVCO 1.0 dataset used by 
Chenoweth and Stephan (2011), and extends the research possibilities by disaggregating the 
unit of analysis from ‘campaign’ to ‘campaign-year’, which opens up for more reliable tests 
of causal processes (Chenoweth & Lewis, 2013d: 416). Additionally, ‘ideal-types’ of conflict 
(i.e. nonviolent and violent) have been included to aid the identification of causal mechanisms 
associated with campaign strategy (Chenoweth & Lewis, 2013d: 416). 
 NAVCO 2.0 contains yearly data of 150 violent and 100 nonviolent campaigns 
between 1945 and 2006. These campaigns constitute the full population
7
 of presently known 
major maximalist campaigns (Chenoweth & Lewis, 2013d: 416). All included campaigns are 
major, mature campaigns with stated maximalist goals, and a coherent organization over time 
(Chenoweth & Lewis, 2013a: 2). The campaigns, as well as the dates for onset and end, are 
based on consensus data from multiple sources, reviewed by leading authorities within the 
field of nonviolent conflict and social movements
8
. Campaigns have been included along two 
rules of inclusion – first, they must have at least 1,0009 participants; and second, they must 
have a stated maximalist goal of regime change, expelling foreign occupation, or self-
determination (Chenoweth & Lewis, 2013d: 417). 
First, in order to qualify as a campaign in the NAVCO 2.0 dataset, a contentious event 
with at least 1,000 participants must be followed within a year by another contentious event of 
1,000 or more participants that claim the same goals. In addition, there must be evidence of 
organization and coordination between the events (Chenoweth & Lewis, 2013d: 417).  
Second, only campaigns that purport ‘maximalist’ goals of regime change, secession, 
or the removal of foreign occupation at some point in their duration are included. In other 
words, reformist or limited calls for policy change that do not challenge the established 
                                                 
7
 Note that the campaign ‘Venezuelan anti-coup (2002)’ was included in NAVCO v1.1, but was mistakenly 
omitted from the NAVCO v2.0 (Chenoweth & Lewis, 2013c: 8). 
8
 The data were gathered from an extensive review of the literature, including encyclopedias, case studies and 
qualitative works on nonviolence and social movements. The resultant data were subjected to a corroboration 
method of review by a dozen experts, who were asked to assess their categorization as violent/nonviolent, 
whether their outcomes were correctly identified, and whether any cases were omitted. If any new cases were 
suggested, they were subjected to the same process (Chenoweth & Lewis, 2013d: 419). 
9
 Note that in NAVCO v1.1, the inclusion rule for major violent maximalist campaigns followed the Correlates 
of War Project’s inclusion rule of 1,000 battle deaths. NAVCO 2.0 continues this focus, but have for comparison 
and compatibility purposes revised the start and end dates of these campaigns to the time period when the 
campaigns had 1,000 ‘participants’ – in order to correspond better to the inclusion criteria for nonviolent 
campaigns (Chenoweth & Lewis, 2013c: 1). 
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regime are not included. However, some campaigns begin as reformist, but turn toward 
maximalist goals during the course of the campaign. Such cases are included, while those that 
remain reformist throughout are excluded (Chenoweth & Lewis, 2013d: 417) 
In the NAVCO 2.0 dataset, campaign onset is coded as the date of the first event 
associated with the campaign that reached the 1,000 participant threshold, as is the coding of 
the onset variable in this thesis (Chenoweth & Lewis, 2013d: 419).  
The dependent variable in this thesis is the onset of major maximalist campaigns, as 
coded by Butcher and Svensson (2014: 9). In their analysis of manufacturing and the onset of 
nonviolent and violent campaigns, they use the NAVCO 2.0 data to code a nominal onset 
variable, in which 0 denotes no major campaign onset, a value of 1 is assigned to state-years 
in which a major nonviolent campaign onset occurred, and a value of 2 for state-years in 
which a major violent campaign onset occurred.  
5.1.1 Notes on NAVCO 2.0 and the Dependent Variable 
There are certain issues with the NAVCO 2.0 data that should be addressed before moving on 
to the independent variables and statistical model.  
First, the inclusion threshold of 1,000 participants for the campaigns is inherently 
arbitrary, as is any threshold applied to a qualitative concept. Chenoweth and Lewis (2013d: 
417) admit to this, but maintain that as one is forced to begin somewhere, this is a logical 
starting point. First, because setting such a high cutoff point decreases the issues of 
underreporting, and second because 1,000 participants emulates the standard of 1,000 battle 
deaths set and utilized by the Correlates of War Project. The authors argue that by setting the 
threshold at 1,000 participants, the comparison to similar datasets of violent conflict is more 
readily made without facing the severe underreporting issues one would if the cutoff point 
was set lower, at for instance 25 participants
10
.  
While it is important to note that this is a feature of the data, it is not necessarily a 
grave cause for concern, as long as we are aware that we are analyzing major campaigns and 
that our inferences based on the data should reflect this acknowledgement. Thus, the findings 
of this thesis will be limited to major nonviolent and violent campaigns with maximalist 
goals, and cannot be used to generalize beyond that.  
                                                 
10
 To correspond to the Uppsala/PRIO threshold of 25 battle-related deaths in civil wars.  
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Second, and far more perturbing, is the question of comparability of nonviolent and 
violent campaigns. The previous iteration of the NAVCO dataset – v1.0 – had separate 
inclusion rules for violent and nonviolent campaigns, in which nonviolent campaigns must 
meet a participation threshold of 1,000 participants, while violent campaigns were included if 
1,000 battle-related deaths occurred. Arguably, both thresholds result in the inclusion of large 
campaigns, but to compare 1,000 deaths to 1,000 participants is not necessarily as 
straightforward as it may seem. In the NAVCO 2.0 data, this has been amended – the onset 
and end dates of both violent and nonviolent campaigns have the same participatory inclusion 
threshold of 1,000 participants, though the focus on 1,000 battle-related deaths remain for the 
violent campaigns (Chenoweth & Lewis, 2013c: 1). Though the authors stress this point in 
their codebook, the participatory threshold for violent campaigns is still gleaned from an 
implied participation based on the battle-death threshold of 1,000 in the datasets used for data 
on violent campaigns (Chenoweth & Lewis, 2013a: 4). Essentially, the question remains: can 
we compare nonviolent campaigns with 1,000 or more participants to violent campaigns of 
1,000 or more participants which generate 1,000 or more battle-related deaths a year? 
This is a complex problem, because it concerns the very conceptualizations, tactics 
and efficacies of the two different campaigns. When we know that nonviolent campaigns rely 
upon mass mobilization in order to be efficient and successful while violent campaigns can 
cause severe disruption despite low participation, is it sensible to apply the same threshold of 
participation? Also, as battle-related deaths could imply something about the intensity of the 
violent conflict, should there be some kind of related indicator for nonviolent campaign’s 
intensity? While these are important and interesting concerns, there is no conclusive answer. 
The two concepts, though intrinsically related, have very different qualifications, and any 
threshold imposed for participation would incur some problem for comparison. How many 
battle-related deaths compare equally to nonviolent participation is difficult to assess, and 
therefore, this thesis relies on the expertise of the leading authorities on nonviolent conflict 
who have corroborated on the dataset (Chenoweth & Lewis, 2013d: 419-420). 
 Third, the NAVCO 2.0 data allow for mixed tactics within the campaigns. 
Acknowledging that campaigns are seldom strictly nonviolent or violent, and that several 
campaigns experience radical flanks, transform throughout their duration, or are comprised of 
mixed tactics throughout the campaign is important (Chenoweth & Lewis, 2013a: 3). 
However, as this thesis is concerned with the onset of campaigns, as well as ideal types, the 
analysis focuses on what Chenoweth and Lewis dub the ‘primary method’ of the campaigns. 
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In other words, when campaigns rely primarily on nonviolent tactics, they are defined as 
nonviolent, and when they rely primarily on violent tactics, they are defined as violent.  
While this is a simplification of a very complex universe of resistance methods, the 
types are not irrelevant, and a distinction is theoretically salient (Chenoweth & Lewis, 2013a: 
3). Because we know that there are discerning characteristics between the two types, it is 
necessary to categorize each campaign as nonviolent or violent, even if it is a simplification 
(Chenoweth & Lewis, 2013d: 422). Again, this thesis relies on the expertise and corroboration 
that went into the consensus method of generation of the NAVCO 2.0 dataset (Chenoweth & 
Lewis, 2013a, 2013d).  
 Fourth, the second inclusion rule of maximalist goals eliminates all reformist 
campaigns from the dataset. According to Chenoweth and Lewis, this rule is in place to 
“ensure conflict conditions and to generate a conservative test of the efficacy of nonviolence” 
(Chenoweth & Lewis, 2013d: 417). Though the theoretical foundation of this thesis does not 
specify maximalist goals, it is implied that the conflict ensuing repressive change often should 
be directed at regime change. However, in other cases it might also be probable that the 
dissidents would demand policy change – perhaps especially when the repressive level 
increases from a low level. If this is the case, this analysis will not be able to ascertain this, 
which may influence the results. Nevertheless, no viable alternative exists at present, and I am 
forced to accept that the findings in this thesis are limited to mature, maximalist campaigns, 
pending data which include civil rights movements and reformist campaigns.  
 Finally, and perhaps most importantly, there is the pressing concern of underreporting 
bias. While this issue is not unique to nonviolent conflict data, it is feasibly more pronounced 
than for other types of contentious politics, such as violent campaigns. The data may be 
biased towards success, because it is large and mature campaigns that are most commonly 
reported while campaigns that are crushed in their infancy and thus fail are not included in the 
dataset (Chenoweth & Lewis, 2013a: 4).  
More importantly for this study, however, is the possibility that highly repressive 
conditions, both with regards to press freedom to report and to response to dissent, might 
effectively suppress initiated campaigns that fail in the face of repression. Because we lack 
information about such unknown campaigns, we are forced to assume their nonexistence.  
Given the research question and hypotheses of this thesis this is a frustrating problem. 
While we cannot know if there was a failed campaign, or if no campaign were ever initiated, 
in the highly repressive state, both cases would be of interest to the question at hand. In the 
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resultant analyses, the examples are treated the same – as non-occurrence, which may bias the 
results negatively. Although ameliorating actions have been taken to neutralize this 
underreporting bias, this is a constant feature of all conflict research which deserves attention, 
and must be considered when drawing inferences from quantitative models
11
. 
Several measures have been taken to counteract the effects of underreporting bias – 
among which is the comparison to violent campaigns, which suffer from a similar issue, 
rather than viewing nonviolent campaigns in isolation. Furthermore the high threshold for 
inclusion ensures that we concern ourselves with large and mature campaigns of both kinds, 
which are more likely to be reported by media even if they are faced with repressive 
measures. Additionally, as the data are based on a consensus sample, more faith can be stored 
in that all known campaigns in the given time period is included. Unknown, failed campaigns 
of either denomination are necessarily omitted from the dataset (Chenoweth & Lewis, 2013a: 
5; 2013d: 420).  
To summarize, these concerns are essentially relevant with regards to external validity. 
The findings of this thesis are thus limited to major campaigns with maximalist goals and a 
high level of participation over time (Chenoweth & Lewis, 2013d: 420).  
5.1.2 The Dataset 
The dataset used for this analysis is based on the dataset created by Butcher and Svensson 
(2014). It has been expanded to include a measure of repression, as well as additional control 
variables. The unit of analysis is state-year for all independent states between 1972 and 2006.  
 The dataset is constricted as compared to the original by (Butcher & Svensson, 2014), 
because there is a lack of data on repression before 1972. This reduces the amount of conflicts 
in the dataset, but with no alternative measures of repression corresponding to the theoretical 
concept available, the restriction seems necessary. There are 74 major, maximalist nonviolent 
campaign onsets and 73 major, maximalist violent campaign onsets in the resultant dataset, 
with a total of 3,929 units of analysis.  
In the original NAVCO 2.0 dataset, there are 150 violent and 100 nonviolent 
campaigns. In other words, I have lost more violent campaigns than nonviolent campaigns. In 
addition, I have restricted the time period to 30 years, which is only half of the original 
                                                 
11
 Other than the measures described below, we are forced to accept the underreporting bias as is. Any 
assumption of failed conflict based on repressive levels would be counterfactual, and indeed risky, as repression 
has both constraining and aggrieving features (as described in the theory chapter).  Sometimes what we don’t 
know would be of interest, but as we don’t know we cannot be sure. Such is the life of a social scientist.  
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timespan in NAVCO 2.0. These concerns are not amendable, pending increased data 
collection on repression, but should be noted as a limitation to the study’s external validity. 
The findings presented in this thesis are thus a result of analysis of all independent states 
between 1972 and 2006, and the implications should be interpreted as such.  
5.2 Statistical Model  
The dependent variable is nominal and has three outcomes; (i) no major maximalist campaign 
onset; (ii) onset of major maximalist nonviolent campaign; (iii) onset of major maximalist 
violent campaign. These outcomes are mutually exclusive – campaign onset either occurs or it 
does not, and in the event of campaign onset it can only be assigned one primary method, 
either violent or nonviolent. I therefore employ multinomial logit analysis to model the 
likelihood of the three outcomes of the dependent variable, setting ‘no major maximalist 
campaign onset’ as the reference category.  
 There are several reasons why I use multinomial logit analysis. Chief among them, we 
cannot assume a linear relationship between the independent and dependent variables, as the 
dependent variable is conceptually nonlinear. My intention is to discover the effect of the 
independent variables on the probability of nonviolent or violent conflict onset, relative to no 
conflict onset. These outcomes are mutually exclusive, and the probability can only vary 
between 0 and 1. Ordinary Least Squares regression (OLS) assumes a linear relationship, and 
thus employing it in analyses with nominal dependent variables can lead to nonsensical 
predictions, in which the estimated y can take on values that lie beyond reasonable 
probabilities
12
 (Long, 1997: 39).  
 The potentially nonsensical predicted y-values can be driven by the assumption in 
OLS that each additional unit of x1 produces a constant effect on y – due to the assumed linear 
relationship. However, in this case of probability estimation, it is more realistic to assume a 
nonlinear relationship between x1 and y as additional units should have a diminishing effect on 
the probability of y = 1 as the probability approaches 0 or 1 (Long, 1997: 39-40).  
 Estimating probabilities of an outcome given a set of independent variables could also 
be achieved using multinomial probit analysis. Because these statistical methods frequently 
produce similar estimates, the choice between them is usually a matter of convention (Stock 
                                                 
12
 Such as a negative predicted probability – i.e. a probability less than 0 – or a predicted probability greater than 
1. While famous athletes may consider themselves to be at “110 % effort”, operating with probabilities beyond 1 
(or 100 %) is unreasonable with regards to conflict onset relative to no conflict.  
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& Watson, 2012: 435-436). I therefore follow Butcher and Svensson (2014: 9, 12)  and others 
in using multinomial logit. 
5.2.1 Concerns with Time-Series Cross-Section Data 
Autocorrelation, or the correlation between the a time series variable and its lagged value is a  
grave concern with the use of time-series cross-section (TSCS) data (Stock & Watson, 2012: 
405-406). Autocorrelated omitted variables further exacerbate the issue, producing 
autocorrelated regression errors, and thus heteroskedacity. Autocorrelation may be both 
spatial and temporal, and in logit analyses utilizing TSCS data, failing to account for either 
type of autocorrelation produces inefficient estimation and incorrect standard errors (Beck, 
2001: 288).  
Temporal autocorrelation violates the assumption of temporal independence in both 
probit and logit analyses, and the produced standard errors will be incorrect, understating 
variance. Additionally, the autocorrelated error terms can also affect the parameter estimates. 
Thus, ignoring the temporal dependence of TSCS data with a categorical dependent variable 
may produce inefficient and overly optimistic estimates (Beck, Katz, & Tucker, 1998: 1263). 
To correct for temporal dependence, I follow Butcher and Svensson (2014: 11) in including a 
cubic polynomial of time since last nonviolent campaign and a cubic polynomial of time since 
last violent campaign (Beck et al., 1998; D. B. Carter & Signorino, 2010) 
Spatial autocorrelation may also bias the estimates and standard errors of a 
multinomial logit model, and therefore standard errors are clustered on states, to allow for 
autocorrelation within each state, but assuming no autocorrelation across states (Stock & 
Watson, 2012: 404-405). Clustered standard errors
13
 are have been shown to perform well, 
and to be robust against false assumptions of heteroskedacity (Beck & Katz, 1995: 641).  
Finally, regional dummy variables are included in robustness checks, to control for 
additional spatial autocorrelation.  
5.2.2 Measuring Repression 
Recalling the conceptualization of repression in Chapter 3 (see 3.2 Repression), as well as the 
theoretical suppositions of Chapter 4, there are two separate types of repression. While I am 
                                                 
13
 Though Beck and Katz (1995)  discuss panel-corrected standard errors, other scholars have equated the two 
(King & Roberts, 2015: 163).  
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mostly interested in the constraining factors of civil liberties repression, personal integrity 
repression may have a similar effect and it would be preferable to include it in the analysis.  
Recalling Chapter 3, section 3.2.2, the theoretical concept of civil liberties repression 
is concerned with governmental infringement on First Amendment-type rights. Civil liberties 
repression constitutes state behavior and/or policy that limits or restricts, for instance, civil 
freedoms of participation, expression, association, travel, or assembly (Davenport, 2007a: 2). 
For this thesis, I use the Freedom House Civil Liberties scale from the annual Freedom in the 
World report to operationalize this concept (FreedomHouse, 2015a, 2015b).  
 The coding rules of the civil liberties scale from Freedom House correspond closely to 
the theoretical concept presented in Chapter 3. Regimes that score highly on the seven-point 
civil liberties scale are very restrictive of such liberties as expression and association, are 
marked by frequent political arrests, and are often expansive in their areas of control. A value 
of 1 on the CL scale indicates that the population enjoys a wide range of civil liberties
14
, free 
economic activity, and that the country has an established and generally fair legal system that 
ensures the rule of law.  It is important to note, however, that a 1 on the civil liberties scale 
does not necessarily equate liberal democracy, but that the two are highly correlated 
(FreedomHouse, 2015a, 2015b). The scale is built on 15 indicators of freedom of expression 
and belief, associational and organizational rights, the rule of law, and personal autonomy and 
individual rights (FreedomHouse, 2015b)
15
.  
Operationalizing Personal integrity repression proves more of a challenge, if not 
impossible. Because the goal of this thesis is to establish an effect of changes in the repressive 
levels of a regime, a scale that considers both state behavior and state policy is necessary. No 
such scale exists for personal integrity violations. The most widely used scales measuring 
something close to my theoretical concept – the Political Terror Scale (PTS) data project 
(Wood & Gibney, 2010) and the Cingranelli and Richards (CIRI) data project (Cingranelli & 
Richards, 2010) both fall short of the requirements. Both scales are indexes based on several 
indicators, and utilizing the same empirical sources. In addition, both scales give scores based 
on governmental behavior within a single year, disregarding the governmental policies behind 
the behavior.  
                                                 
14
 Including freedoms of expression, assembly, association, education, and religion. 
15
 A detailed description of the indicators, the question included in them, and the scoring practices can be found 
in Freedom House’s online methodology (FreedomHouse, 2015b). For the purposes of this thesis the importance 
is to note that the indicators correspond closely to the content of the theoretical concept.  
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 This last point is what renders both scales useless for the purposes of this analysis. 
Because the PTS measures actual violations occurring within country-years, the score would 
not necessarily reflect the repressiveness of the state, or their attitude towards personal 
integrity repression. As a consequence, regimes that are successful in their deterrent 
repression could receive a low score on the PTS – not because the regime is not willing or 
capable of imposing physical sanctions on its citizens, but because it does not have to. History 
has countless examples of less frequent acts of physical repression, and studies have 
established a U-curve of repression – democracies repress less than autocracies, but 
autocracies repress less than transitional regimes or anocracies (Carey, 2010; Davenport, 
2007b; Davenport & Armstrong, 2004; Fein, 1995; Regan & Henderson, 2002). In other 
words, frequent application of personal integrity repression is perhaps most likely in regimes 
that are establishing their authority, and less so in established dictatorships, because there is a 
temporal dependency that the scale does not take into account. The previous actions of a 
regime will help deter future challenges, and therefore the necessity of repression of personal 
integrity (Wood & Gibney, 2010: 370).   
The problem then, is that since the score does not in fact measure the extent to which 
the regime is willing and able to impose such sanctions on its populace, but rather to what 
extent it actually does, we cannot know whether a state with a score of 2 is a really successful 
repressive state, or a reasonably open state with a few blemishes on its track sheet. Also, the 
concept of repressive instability, or change, is less theoretically precise if we apply this scale. 
The result would presumably be several instances of change in level of repression on the scale 
that in fact were not change in the level of repression over all, and thus would not be an 
appropriate operationalization of our theoretical concept. In other words, the measurement 
validity would be compromised, which would draw the validity of the analysis into question 
(Adcock & Collier, 2001). Therefore, the concept of personal integrity repression has been 
excluded from this analysis pending more suitable data material, and concepts of repressive 
change are operationalized by the Civil Liberties scale from Freedom House exclusively 
(FreedomHouse, 2015a). 
Utilizing the Civil Liberties scale is not without potential for criticism. First, as it is an 
aggregated scale measuring a diffuse and wide concept, some degree of subjectivity is 
necessarily involved. Freedom House is open about its normative approach, stating that 
“Freedom in the World operates from the assumption that freedom for all peoples is best 
achieved in liberal democratic societies” (FreedomHouse, 2015b). The report’s methodology 
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is derived from the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and an assumption that these are 
indeed global in their validity (FreedomHouse, 2015b). Second, the methodology is reviewed 
periodically, to keep up with evolving ideas about civil liberties (FreedomHouse, 2015b). 
While this is desirable from a theoretical view, it may reduce the comparability of the values 
across time.  
The idealistic leanings are somewhat amended by an easily accessible methodology, as 
well as the consensus approach to scoring the cases. As the methodology is easily accessed by 
the public, scholars can review the indicators and questions used to score countries to evaluate 
the scale’s applicability. The rigorous consensus approach, as well as the relatively high 
number of analysts, expert advisors, and scholars involved in the discussions and scoring 
ensures some certainty that the values assigned are not the product of individual bias or 
mistakes, which increases the reliability (FreedomHouse, 2015b). Nevertheless, this is – as it 
always is in social sciences – one noteworthy objection to the use of this scale. Still, if the 
goal is to measure repressiveness and the change thereof without resorting to counting 
occasions of overt repression, some subjectivity is necessary
16
. As such, the credibility of 
Freedom House and its panel of experts, as well as their coding practices, seem sufficient to 
defend the use of the scale.  
Second, according to the Freedom House Methodology (2015b), the issue of 
comparability over time is solved by incrementally instituting changes, as well as not revising 
the time-series data retroactively
17
. This may not be a perfect solution, and the problem of 
comparing any subjective score across time is a pervasive threat to measurement validity, and 
thus the internal validity, of cross-sectional time-series analyses in social sciences (Adcock & 
Collier, 2001: 535).  Still, it does not appear to be any greater for the CL scale than other 
aggregated scales, such as those of institutional polity. It is necessary nevertheless worth 
mentioning, to note the possible weakness of any analysis including such scales.  
There are especially two aspects of the Civil Liberties scale and Freedom House’s 
methodology that are attractive for the purposes of this analysis. First, it does not equate legal 
guarantees of rights with the real-world practices and fulfillments. Both are factored into the 
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 After all, repression must always be relational to some ideal of ‘liberal’ – a state is repressive to the degree 
that it is not permissive of certain defined and ideal liberties. The fact that Freedom House openly addresses the 
ideal on which cases are judged only increases the researcher’s possibility to make an informed choice. 
17
 Retroactively revising the data would not necessarily increase the comparability. The issue of context-
specificity is enlightened in Adcock and Collier (2001: 535) – ‘complete’ freedom (1 on CL) may not have had 
the same standards thirty years ago as it does today. However, since the time span in this analysis is relatively 
short, 34 years, compared to other analyses in social sciences, I do not judge this to be a fundamental objection 
to the use of the CL scale.  
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scoring, but implementation is given precedence (FreedomHouse, 2015b). This allows the 
score to reflect the effective repressive level in the country, rather than the less trustworthy 
constitutional situation. Furthermore, each country’s score is based on conditions and events 
in their territorial jurisdiction annually, and are influenced by previous scores. Thus, the 
temporal dependency lacking in the PTS scale is accounted for in CL,  with changes denoting 
real-world development – such as hard restrictions on press freedom, or a country’s first free 
and fair election – or occasionally gradual changes (FreedomHouse, 2015b). This corresponds 
well to the idea of liberalization or autocratization employed in this thesis – change is 
signaled by events or radical changes, or occasionally a gradual evolution, rather than some 
count of overt behavior.  
The next section reviews the coding of the independent variables, and the limitations 
lack of data imposes on the analysis.   
5.2.3 Repression as Independent  
The lack of data has proven to be a grave challenge for this analysis. With fairly limited data 
availability on repression combined with nonviolent conflicts being relatively rare events, 
coupled with a high threshold of inclusion for conflicts in NAVCO 2.0, the options for testing 
the hypotheses presented in Chapter 4 are restricted. The original intention was to create 
dummy variables denoting movement between the three repressive categories – Not Free, 
Partly Free, and Free. However, this solution proved to be too demanding for the dataset 
containing only 76 nonviolent and 74 violent campaigns, and with several missing values on 
key variables.  
Table 2 shows the frequency of major maximalist campaign onsets by repressive type 
(Free, Partly Free, Not Free) between 1972 and 2006, which highlights the issue. There are 
only two nonviolent campaign onsets and one violent campaign onset in state-years in the 
Free category. The resultant model of the approach described above, which can be perused in 
Appendix Table 3, suffers from overdetermination and questionable standard errors. Thus, 
this solution is untenable for testing my hypotheses, and I have chosen another approach 
pending expanded data on conflict and repression
18
.  
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 That is not to say I wish for more conflict, only larger datasets.  
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Table 2 Frequency of Major Maximalist Campaign Onset by Regime Repressive Type, 1972 to 2006 
 
Onset of NAVCO Major Maximalist Campaign, 1= 
Nonviolent, 2 = Violent  
 0 1 2 Total 
Free 
     
1 1,404 2 1 1,407 
0 3,782 74 73 3,929 
Total  5,186 76 74 5,336 
Partly Free  
     
1 2,360 52 38 2,450 
0 2,826 24 36 2,886 
Total  5,186 76 74 5,336 
Not Free  
     
1 1,422 22 35 1,479 
0 3,764 54 39 3,857 
Total  5,186 76 74 5,336 
 
Notes: There are 4 units with missing values. All of these units have a 0 value on the onset 
variable, i.e. none of them experienced conflict onset.  
 
This problem also reduces the number of hypotheses I am able to test using this dataset. The 
three hypotheses specifying the level of repression before liberalization or autocratization are 
therefore not tested in this thesis, which leaves me with four hypotheses:  
 
H1: Liberalization of repression opens the opportunity structure, which allows the 
aggrieved populace to address longstanding grievances, and thus increases the 
likelihood of conflict onset.  
 
H3: Liberalization of civil liberties increases the likelihood of nonviolent conflict 
onset relative to no conflict onset.  
 
H5: Autocratization reduces the likelihood of conflict onset.  
 
-and- 
 
H6: Autocratization toward extreme repression decreases the likelihood of 
conflict onset. 
 
While restricting the number of hypotheses is a disappointment, it is an eventuality one must 
accept when research is theory-driven. The real world does not always provide the necessary 
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data to test all hypotheses. That does not make them any less substantially interesting, and 
these theoretical propositions deserve academic attention at some future point in research, 
when data is more readily available.  
The independent variables used to test the three remaining hypotheses are based on 
data on civil liberties from the Freedom in the World reports from Freedom House 
(FreedomHouse, 2015a, 2015b, 2015c). The Civil Liberties scale from Freedom House ranges 
from 1 to 7, where 1 denotes completely free – or least repressive – and 7 represents 
completely repressive (FreedomHouse, 2015b). The Freedom House methodology operates 
with a tripartite denotation of states – Free, Partly Free, and Not Free, which corresponds to 
the respective values of 1, 2 (Free), 3, 4, and 5 (Partly Free), and 6, 7 (Not Free). A dummy 
variable is created for states with values 1 or 2 (Free) and for states with a value of 6 or 7 
(NotFree). The units with a 1 on the Free dummy variable are dropped from the analysis 
because there are only two occurrences of conflict, which confounds the estimates and 
standard errors in the analysis. The resulting model is then restricted to information on Not 
Free states and Partly Free states, and contains 3,929 state-years based on data from 149 
countries, with 74 nonviolent and 73 violent campaign onsets.  
To capture liberalization and autocratization, a variable indicating a change on the 
civil liberties scale from t-1 to t is created. The resultant measure ranges from -5 to 4. Based 
on this variable, two variables denoting liberal change (change_pos) and autocratic change 
(change_neg) are created
19
. Using the Binary Time-Series Cross-Section (BTSCS) software 
for STATA created by Beck et al. (1998), two variables measuring time since liberalization 
(ts_pos) and autocratization (ts_neg) were created.  
Finally, proximity to either type of change in the level of civil liberties repression is 
measured by two decay variables (ProximitytoLiberalization and ProximitytoAutocratization). 
The decay variables use the variables measuring time since change and a decay rate denoting 
at what rate the effect of repressive change reduces over time – i.e., how long it takes before 
the effect of the repressive change is reduced to 50 %. The formula for the decay function is 
thus 2
(-t ∕ α)
, where t is time since repressive change, and α is the decay rate. For the base 
model, α = 8 is chosen because this is the value that produced the best log likelihood20. This 
means that for the countries in the sample it takes, in general, 8 years before the effects of 
autocratization or liberalization of repressive policies have been reduced by 50 %. Both decay 
                                                 
19
 Liberalization (change_pos) = CLchange<0, autocratization (change_neg) = CLchange> 0. 
20
 The full formula for each decay variable is then decay_pos_8 = 2
(-ts_pos ∕ 8) 
,  and decay_neg_8 = 2
(-ts_neg ∕ 8)
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variables are continuous measures varying between 1 and 0, with 1 denoting maximal 
proximity to change. The Proximity-variables do not assign effect of liberalization or 
autocratization until changet+1, to ensure that the repressive change and conflict are not 
measured in the same year.  
Finally, an interaction term between the dummy variable NotFree and the decay 
variable Proximity to Autocratization is included to capture the proposed relationship between 
autocratization and extreme levels of repression described in H6 – that autocratization leading 
into extreme levels of repression will decrease the likelihood of conflict. 
5.2.4 Control Variables  
In logistic regression, omitted variable bias is a graver concern than in OLS regression 
(Mood, 2010: 67). Exclusion of variables that affect either the dependent or independent 
variables will bias estimates upwards or downwards by a factor determined by the correlation 
between the excluded variable and the independent variable, and the correlation between the 
excluded variable and the dependent variable when controlling for the independent variable. 
In addition, excluding variables that affect either the dependent or independent variables will 
bias our estimates downwards by a factor determined by the difference in residual variance 
between the models including and excluding the variable (Mood, 2010: 67-69). 
In other words, specifying an inclusive model with factors thought to influence the 
dependent and independent variables is especially important in logistic regression. That is not 
to say that we abandon the ideal of parsimony, but rather that we should pay close attention 
when we attempt to identify potential spurious effects. Including irrelevant variables will bias 
estimates upwards because the scale they are based on is changed (Mood, 2010; Stock & 
Watson, 2012:359; Train, 2003: 44-45). Thus, the control variables should have theoretical 
arguments supporting their inclusion to avoid this.  
Given this, it is far more likely that the model suffers from omitted variable bias, 
which reduces the size of the estimates. Additionally, it is possible that the unobserved 
variance is not the same across all units (Train, 2003: 45). The latter is somewhat ameliorated 
by clustering the standard errors on states. The former is more difficult. Because the 
unobserved variance stems from unknown variables and affects the parameter estimates, these 
become less interpretable (King, Tomz, & Wittenberg, 2000; Mood, 2010). To somewhat 
amend this issue, I run simulations of the main model using the STATA software addition 
CLARIFY to produce quantities of interest that are more intuitive and somewhat less affected 
55 
 
by the unexplained variance (King et al., 2000; Mood, 2010; Tomz, Wittenberg, & King, 
2003). While this is not a complete fix to the issue, it does produce more intuitive parameters 
which can be translated into substantive effects.  
I thus include control variables thought to influence the onset of nonviolent conflict, 
and the control variables included in this study correspond closely to those applied by Butcher 
and Svensson (2014: 10).  
The composition and size of the population has been shown to affect the likelihood of 
both violent and nonviolent conflict onset – states with large populations are more likely to 
experience conflict than those with smaller populations (Chenoweth & Lewis, 2013d; 
Cunningham, 2013: 300; Hegre & Sambanis, 2006). Therefore, a logged measure of the 
population size is introduced (lnPopulationt-1). Additionally, nonviolent conflict is thought to 
be an urban phenomenon (Celestino & Gleditsch, 2013). In addition, urbanization may help 
overcome collective action problems related to conflict onset (Butcher & Svensson, 2014: 
11), and therefore a measure of the proportion of the population living in urban areas 
(Urbanization) from the WBD (2013) is included to control for these effects (Butcher & 
Svensson, 2014: 11).  
GDP per capita has been established as a determinant for violent conflict in several 
studies (Fearon et al., 2007; Fearon & Laitin, 2003; Hegre & Sambanis, 2006). The proposed 
mechanisms behind the effect that states with higher GDP per capita have lower likelihood of 
conflict onset than states with lower GDP per capita are plentiful. Some argue that GDP per 
capita is a measure of state capacity or rebellion capacity (Collier & Hoeffler, 2004; Collier et 
al., 2009; Fearon & Laitin, 2003), others that low GDP per capita is a cause of grievance. The 
same effects of GDP per capita have not been established for nonviolent conflict (Chenoweth 
& Lewis, 2013d; Cunningham, 2013), but in order to control for either mechanism, a measure 
of real GDP per capita (GDPpc) from the Penn World Table version 7.1 (Aten, Heston, & 
Summers, 2013) is introduced as a control variable
21
.   
Tucker (2007) argues that election years provide a focal point for an aggrieved 
population, and therefore conflict is more likely to occur in such years. Elections mobilize 
large segments of the populace, and may therefore instigate nonviolent conflict in the event 
that the election sparks a grievance, as electoral fraud might (Beissinger, 2007, 2013; Tucker, 
2007). I include the dummy variable (Election) marking whether a state-held election 
                                                 
21
 The variable is included in the dataset by Butcher and Svensson (2014). 
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occurred in a given year created by Butcher and Svensson (2014: 11) to control for this 
effect
22
.   
As a feature of the repressive state system, large military forces may deter the 
occurrence of nonviolent conflict, or facilitate repressive actions against nascent nonviolent 
conflict, making them a ‘non-occurrence’. However, authors have also emphasized the 
importance of military defections for nonviolent conflict, and large military forces may aid 
the dissidents seeking to provoke this effect (Butcher & Svensson, 2014; Nepstad, 2013). 
Following (Butcher & Svensson, 2014: 11), I include their measure of lagged number of 
military personnel for a given state-year (MilitaryPersonnelt-1) to control for this effect
23
.  
Several studies have identified learning effects of conflict – i.e. previous experience 
with conflict increases the likelihood of conflict onset. A temporal dependency of peace on 
conflict has been repeatedly established – states that have enjoyed long periods without 
conflict are less likely to experience conflict onset than states that have had conflict in their 
immediate past (Collier & Hoeffler, 2004; Hegre et al., 2001; Hegre & Sambanis, 2006: 531). 
In addition, previous experience with either violent or nonviolent campaigns may have left 
behind an existing infrastructure for dissent, which facilitates new campaigns I include the 
cubic polynomial of the time since the last nonviolent and violent campaign created by 
Butcher and Svensson (2014), using the binary time-series cross-section (BTSCS) software in 
STATA (Beck et al., 1998; D. B. Carter & Signorino, 2010).
24
  
The onset of either violent or nonviolent conflict may also be affected by the existence 
of other contemporary conflicts, both in the near vicinity of a state and in the world in 
general. Conflicts in other countries may signal an opening in the opportunity structure of 
which dissidents take advantage. Additionally, diffusion effects of both violent and 
nonviolent conflict have found empirical evidence – conflict in neighboring countries 
increases the likelihood of conflict (Beissinger, 2007; Celestino & Gleditsch, 2013; Hegre & 
Sambanis, 2006: 532-533; Weyland, 2012). Like Butcher and Svensson (2014: 11), I include 
variables denoting the number of nonviolent and violent conflict onsets globally, each given 
year (NumberNonviolOnset, NumberViolOnset). Additionally, I include two variables 
                                                 
22
 The variable is created by Butcher and Svensson (2014: 11), using the National Elections Across Democracy 
and Autocracy data (NELDA;Hyde & Marinov, 2011). 
23
 The variable is created by Butcher and Svensson (2014: 11), using the National Material Capabilities Data 
version 4.0 at the Correlates of War Project (Singer, 1988). 
24
 These measures of time dependency are labeled: NonViolStabilityYears, NonViolStabilityYears
2
, 
NonViolStabilityYears
3
, ViolStabilityYears, ViolStabilityYears
2
, and ViolStabilityYears
3
. 
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denoting conflict onset of either violence or nonviolence in a 50km radius for each state 
(NeighborNonViol, NeighborViol).   
Various measures of institutional democracy or polity are often included in analyses of 
conflict (Butcher & Svensson, 2014; Collier & Hoeffler, 2004; Collier et al., 2009; 
Cunningham, 2013; Hegre, 2014; Hegre et al., 2001; Hegre & Nygård, 2014). Some have 
claimed an inverted U-curved relationship between polity and conflict onset, indicating that 
semi-democracies – or anocracies – are more likely to experience conflict than fully 
institutional democracies or autocracies (Hegre et al., 2001). These findings have been drawn 
into question by other researchers, who argue that the results are driven by the coding in the 
Polity IV scale (Vreeland, 2008). Others argue that regime instability rather than institutional 
polity is the driver of the effect – anocracies experience more conflict because they are more 
unstable (Gates, Hegre, Jones, & Strand, 2006). Including measures of institutional 
democracy/autocracy would in any regard be problematic in this analysis, because they are 
highly correlated with measures of repression. I do, however, include the measure of regime 
change (RegimeChange1to3) in the expanded model to control for the effect of regime 
instability upon conflict onset from Butcher and Svensson (2014), which indicates the 
magnitude of change on the PolityIV scale in the previous three years
25
.  
 The model’s estimates’ robustness is tested by including additional controls from 
Butcher and Svensson (2014: 12) in an expanded model, such as fuel exports exceeding 33 
percent of merchandise exports
26
 (Fuel), region fixed effects, and regime change 
(RegimeChange1to3). I also run a simplified model with only the independent variables.  
 
Table 3 Frequency Statistics for Dichotomous Variables 
Variable  0 1 N Missing 
Not Free 2,450 1,479 3,929 4 
Liberalization 3,411 385 3,796 133 
Autocratization 3,448 348 3,796 133 
Election 3,054 869 3,923 6 
Fuelt-1 (33% of exports) 2,974 764 3,738 191 
Notes: All units with 1 on the variable Free are excluded from this table. The full frequency table for the 
dataset can be perused in Appendix Table 1 
                                                 
25
 The variable created by Butcher and Svensson (2014: 11) is based on the PolityIV project (Marshall, Jaggers, 
& Gurr, 2011). 
26
 This variable is also created by Butcher and Svensson (2014: 12). To correct for the large amount of missing 
values, the authors used a “last known value” imputation, imputing forward from the first known value to the 
next known value (Butcher & Svensson, 2014: 12, 10). 
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Table 4Summary Statistics for Continuous Variables 
Variable  Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max N Missing 
ProximitytoLiberalization 0.66 0.25 0.06 1 3,796 133 
ProximitytoAutocratization 0.65 0.24 0.06 1 3,796 133 
Time since Liberalization 6.04 5.98 0 33 3,796 133 
Time since Autocratization 5.93 5.38 0 33 3,796 133 
lnPopulation  15.96 1.565 11.77 20.99 3,913 16 
Real GDP per capita 4,701.27 7,893.18 160.93 81515.41 3,616 313 
Military Personnelt-1 170.98 476.28 0 4750 3,866 63 
Urbanization 42.84 22.98 2.72 100 3,809 120 
NumberNonViol 2.49 3.20 0 16 3,929 - 
NumberViol 2.25 2.02 0 9 3,929 - 
NeighborhoodViol 0.20 0.24 0 1 3,671 258 
NeighborhoodNonviol 0.05 0.13 0 1 3,671 258 
RegimeChange1to3 0.40 3.27 -18 18 3,907 22 
 
Notes: All units with 1 on the variable Free are excluded from this table. The full frequency table for 
the dataset can be perused in Appendix Table 2 
 
5.3 Methodological Concerns  
In addition to the aforementioned issues related to autocorrelation, two more concerns deserve 
our attention before we move on to the descriptive statistics, and the results of the 
multinomial logit models. First, I will discuss issues of endogeneity in this analysis, and then I 
will address the problem of missing values in an analysis concerning conflict and repression.  
5.3.1 Endogeneity  
Endogeneity caused by reciprocal influence, or codetermination is certainly a grave concern 
in any study of repression and dissent (Stock & Watson, 2012: 461-462).  Undeniably, 
repressive measures may be imposed on a population because the regime is threatened – in 
fact, several analyses highlight this aspect of repression in their definition of the concept. 
However, the theoretical conceptualization of definition in this thesis (Chapter 3, section 3.2) 
shows that repressive measures may also be imposed because of perceived threats or simply 
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to deter any threat. In other words, we are faced with a problem of which came first – 
repression or dissent. As with the famous ‘the chicken or the egg’ conundrum, it is difficult to 
determine. Even more concerning is the focus on changes in repressive policies – these, and 
especially increases in repressiveness – may in fact be responses to dissident activity.  
Nevertheless, the theoretical discussions in chapters 2, 3 and 4 suggest that repression 
may also change because of collapses in will or capacity to repress, or increases in the same. 
Thus, I attempt to ameliorate the endogeneity issues by lagging the effect of repressive 
change by one year, to ensure that the measurement of repressive change occurred previous to 
the onset of the campaigns. I do this rather than making an instrument variable – which can be 
an option – because it is unlikely that any variable correlated with repression would not be 
correlated with conflict as well. In other words, defining a valid instrument variable that 
explains some variation in repression, but is exogeneous – i.e. not correlated with the error 
term – in an analysis of repression and dissent is unlikely to be a successful endeavor. If the 
two criteria of relevance and exogeneity are not fulfilled, the instrument variable-approach 
will not produce the desired results (Stock & Watson, 2012- 480-481).  
Admittedly, there are issues with this approach as well. It may be that events 
preceding the onset of campaign influenced the repressive change. This may be somewhat 
ameliorated by the onset coding in NAVO 2.0. According to Chenoweth and Lewis (2013d), 
the onset date of each campaign is coded “(…) as the date of the first observed event 
associated with the overall campaign meeting the 1,000 participant threshold” (Chenoweth & 
Lewis, 2013d: 419). Nevertheless, we cannot know for certain that dissident activity didn’t 
influence the repressive change prior to this date. Additional lagging of the proximity 
variables might amend this uncertainty further, but there are theoretical concerns that make 
this approach undesirable.  
While the theoretical foundation for this thesis does not specify the speed with which 
the dissidents should react to the repressive change, it seems probable that lagging their 
response with several years is a poor representation of reality. It seems more likely that the 
effect of, and response to, change should be higher in the immediately subsequent years. I 
have therefore chosen to lag the effect of change with one year, while remaining aware of the 
potential criticisms this approach opens up with regards to the findings in my analysis.  
An equally relevant concern is (multi)collinearity. If the independent variables are 
correlated, the standard error will be large, and the estimates will be affected, rendering them 
uncertain. A high degree of multicollinearity is associated with large variance in the 
  
 
60 
 
estimates, making them questionable and imprecise, and establishing significant effects is 
made difficult (Christophersen, 2013: 77). To that end, control variables thought to influence 
the independent and/or the dependent variables that are not correlated with each other are 
included in the model.  
To discover the extent to which collinearity is an issue in this analysis, VIF tests of 
OLS regression of the base model and expanded model are conducted. The results show that 
collinearity is not a significant problem. The interaction term and the independent variables 
Proximity to Autocratization and NotFree are necessarily highly correlated, and the temporal 
controls are also highly correlated with each other. However, excluding the interaction term 
and the temporal controls, none of the variables have a VIF value above 2.10. These results 
can be perused in Appendix Table 4 and 5. Some argue that a VIF value above 5 is cause for 
concern, others 10. In either respect, it does not appear that collinearity is of any grave 
concern in this analysis.  
5.3.2 Missing Data 
Missing data is not uncommon territory in both repression research and quantitative analyses 
on nonviolent conflict, or indeed in political science as a whole. It is a severe concern, 
because as is often the case, systematic missing values degrade the representativeness of the 
data (Acock, 2012: 375; Christophersen, 2013: 81). As such, several answers to the question 
of what to do with unknown – or missing – values for one or more variables have been 
proposed.  
Identifying which kind of missing values we are dealing with is the first step. The 
independent variables in this thesis concern repressive policies in all types of polity. It is 
unreasonable to assume that the gaps in information are completely random, or Missing 
Completely at Random (MCAR). Highly repressive states are also the least likely to be 
forthcoming about their policies, as well as the most difficult to police because they often 
control media and NGO access very closely. Therefore, the missing values are not MCAR, 
nor are they MAR – Missing at Random. The missing values on the variables concerning 
repression can be presumed missing, at least in several instances, precisely because of the 
level of repression in that state. In other words, the missing values of the repression variables 
are Not Missing at Random (NMAR) (Acock, 2012: 375; Christophersen, 2013: 81).  
This makes what to do with them a conundrum. Both excluding the missing variables 
and imputing values will bias our estimates. Faced with no ideal solution, choosing to rely on 
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the data known to represent reality seems preferable, rather than using the other variables in 
the analysis to generate values. This last option is made even less appealing when we consider 
the possibility that several other variables in the model may be equally affected by repressive 
policies, and therefore have missing values for the same units. Therefore, I have not imputed 
any of the variables with missing values. However, the Fuel in Exports variable from 
(Butcher & Svensson, 2014: 11) has been imputed forwards from the first known value by the 
authors to ameliorate a severe degree of missing. As this variable is only used in the expanded 
model for robustness check, I have chosen to use their imputed measure rather than the 
original, because the original variable without imputation restricts my dataset even further, 
with its 1,716 missing values in a dataset excluding ‘Free’ states.  
5.4 Summary 
In this chapter, I have described the research design constructed to test the theoretical 
propositions of Chapter 4. This serves to bridge the gap between theoretical suppositions, 
concepts, and hypotheses, and the empirical data available to test them. Due to lack of data 
availability, only four of the seven hypotheses from Chapter 4 are tested in multinomial 
regression analyses of 3,929 state-years based on data from 149 non-free countries, with 74 
nonviolent and 73 violent campaign onsets, between 1972 and 2006. The next chapter 
presents the results of the empirical analyses, as well as a discussion of the hypotheses, the 
findings, and the robustness and goodness of fit of the models.  
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6 Analysis 
This section is tripartite. First, I offer an initial look at the relationship between the 
independent variables and the dependent variable in distribution plots, before the results of the 
multinomial logistic regression are described and interpreted. Additionally, I present more 
intuitive quantities of interest to further aid the interpretation of the results. The models are 
then subjected to a number of robustness tests and tested for fit to the data. Section three is a 
discussion of the findings in this analysis, including evaluations of the hypotheses.   
6.1 Descriptive statistics  
To get a preliminary idea of the 
relationship between the dependent 
variable, major maximalist campaign 
onset, and the independent variables, 
Proximity to Liberalization and 
Proximity to Autocratization, I 
include figures showing the 
distribution of campaign onsets across 
values of the independent variables. 
To aid interpretation, two figures 
showing the distribution of campaign 
onsets across the variables Time since 
Liberalization, and Time since 
Autocratization are also included.  
 Figure 1 shows the 
distribution of values on the variable 
measuring time since liberalization 
occurred for all cases (dark dash), 
cases where there was an onset of 
nonviolent campaign (solid blue), and 
cases where there was an onset of 
violent campaign (light dash), 
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Figure 1 Distribution of global nonviolent and violent 
campaign onset by time since liberalization, 1972 to 2006 
Figure 2 Distribution of global nonviolent and violent 
campaign onset by proximity to liberalization, 1972 to 2006 
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excluding units with a 1 on the Free dummy. Two patterns stand out. First, the majority of 
cases have a low value on the variable, indicating that liberalization occurs relatively 
frequently, and that both nonviolent and violent campaign onset most often occurs in the 
years immediately after liberalization.  
Secondly, as time passes, the density of cases tapers off in the full sample, a pattern 
which is followed by the distribution of violent campaigns. However, the distribution of 
nonviolent campaigns has a second peak of density of cases between 10 and 15 years after 
liberalization. This may indicate that in cases where liberalization in non-free states is not 
followed by additional liberalization, and the state remains non-free, nonviolent conflict is 
more likely than violent conflict.  
Figure 2 shows the distribution of values on the decay variable, Proximity to 
liberalization, for all cases, cases with nonviolent campaign onset, and cases with violent 
campaign onset, excluding the cases 
with Free=1.  This figure indicates 
the same pattern as the above – the 
density is greatest at high values on 
the proximity variable, but the density 
of nonviolent cases reaches another 
peak below 50 % effect of 
liberalization.  
This feature is interesting 
because it displays the now oft-stated 
suggestion that nonviolent campaigns 
are fundamentally different from 
violent campaigns (Chenoweth & 
Lewis, 2013d; Chenoweth & Ulfelder, 
2015; Cunningham, 2013). The 
distributions of nonviolent campaigns 
over values of Time since 
Liberalization and Proximity to 
Liberalization indicate that this 
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proposition may be true for response to liberalization as well.  
 Figure 3 shows the density of cases on the values of Time since Autocratization. 
Violent conflict onset follows a similar line to that of the full distribution – increasing rapidly 
in the initial few years, and then declining as time passes. The distribution of cases of 
nonviolent conflict onset, however, clearly diverges from this pattern. It appears that 
following an autocratization, the initial likelihood of nonviolent conflict onset is quite low. 
After several years pass, however, nonviolent conflict onsets become more likely. A similar 
pattern is visible in Figure 4, where a distinct peak indicates that a high number of cases of 
major maximalist nonviolent campaign onset occur around the middle values of the Proximity 
to Autocratization variable.  
 Thus, the distributions of nonviolent campaign onset over the autocratization variables 
indicate the same dissimilarity of nonviolent campaign onset from the general distribution and 
violent conflict onset as the distributions over the liberalization variables. Interestingly, all 
four graphs indicate that stability after instability increases the likelihood of nonviolent 
conflict, while decreasing the likelihood of violent conflict. Nevertheless, the general 
impressions from the density figures are that in the initial wake of liberalization, campaign 
onset of either denomination increases in occurrence the first few years, before tapering off, 
and that autocratization initially restricts the number of nonviolent onsets – but interestingly 
enough, not the onset of violent conflict. It appears that violent conflicts occur more 
frequently immediately following autocratization, and as the level of repression is stabilized 
and kept stabile, violent conflict becomes less likely.   
The patterns indicated by the density graphs could be the product of the confounding 
factors described earlier. Table 5 shows the result of the multinomial logistic regression 
analysis for the onset of major, maximalist nonviolent campaigns globally, excluding Free 
states.  
6.2 The Regression Models 
The first model in Table 5, the Base Model, shows the effect of the independent variables on 
the likelihood of nonviolent conflict onset relative to no conflict, controlled for potential 
confounders. Although none of the estimates for the independent variables are significant, 
they indicate similar patterns to those described above. The estimated coefficient for 
Proximity to Liberalization is positive, and quite strong. Although it is not significant at 
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commonly accepted standards, it approaches statistical significance (p = 0.185). Likewise, the 
estimate for Proximity to Autocratization is negative and similarly strong, though great 
uncertainty is connected with this estimation.  
 The estimated coefficients of the independent variables on the likelihood of violent 
campaign onset are not statistically significant. However, the estimate for Proximity to 
Liberalization is positive and fairly strong, reflecting the pattern from the distribution figures 
above. It would appear that violent campaign onset is more likely in the immediate aftermath 
of liberalization – though this estimate is not significant at p = 0.154. The Proximity to 
Autocratization estimate is negative, but so far from an acceptable significance level that we 
cannot set store by it.  
 As the number of conflict onsets this analysis is based on is fairly limited, the potential 
for single cases to heavily influence the results is large. I therefore apply a method similar to 
jackknifing to discover possible outliers disproportionally affecting the estimates and standard 
errors of the Base Model. The multinomial regression analysis is repeated, excluding each 
state sequentially. The scatter plot in Figure 5 shows the resultant estimated coefficients and 
standard errors of Proximity to Liberalization on nonviolent conflict.  
The scatter plot clearly shows that Nepal is an extreme outlier, the exclusion of which 
improves the efficacy of the model massively, while the others are grouped together.  There 
are no obvious reasons why Nepal should be such an outlier, but it is beyond the scope of this  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Figure 5 Outlier Diagnostics. Estimated coefficients and standard errors for Proximity 
to Liberalization on nonviolent campaign onset from repeated multinomial regression 
analyses of the Base Model, excluding each state sequentially.  
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Table 5  Onset of Major Maximalist Campaigns, NAVCO, 1972 to 2006 
  
 Base   Base Model,   
 Model % %StdX excl. Nepal % %StdX 
0 (No campaign onset, ref. cat) 
1 (Nonviolent Campaign Onset) 
       
NotFree -0.165 -15.2   -0.284 -24.8  
 (0.950)   (0.955)   
ProximitytoAutocratization -0.747 -52.6 -16.3 -1.263 -71.7 -26.0 
 (0.919)   (0.827)   
NotFree*ProximityAutocrat 0.008 0.8 0.3 0.376 45.7 14.2 
 (1.543)   (1.546)   
ProximitytoLiberalization 0.747 111.1 20.6 0.999† 171.5 28.6 
 (0.564)   (0.521)   
rGDPpc 0.000 0.0 4.2 0.000 0.0 2.2 
 (0.000)   (0.000)   
lnPopulation  0.320** 37.6 63.5  0.322** 38.0 64.5 
 (0.108)   (0.112)   
Military Personnel t-1 0.000 0.0 13.1 0.000 0.0 13.5 
 (0.000)   (0.000)   
Election  0.817** 126.4   0.864** 137.3  
 (0.266)   (0.268)   
Urbanization 0.002 0.2 5.7 0.005 0.5 11.6 
 (0.008)   (0.008)   
NonViolStabilityYears 0.059   0.058   
 (0.110)   (0.110)   
NonViolStabilityYears2 0.000   0.000   
 (0.006)   (0.006)   
NonViolStabilityYears3 -0.000   -0.000   
 (0.000)   (0.000)   
ViolStabilityYears 0.071   0.066   
 (0.115)   (0.117)   
ViolStabilityYears2 -0.004   -0.004   
 (0.006)   (0.006)   
ViolStabilityYears3 0.000   0.000   
 (0.000)   (0.000)   
NumberNonViolOnsets   0.164*** 17.9 70.2   0.163*** 17.7 69.3 
 (0.025)   (0.026)   
NumberViolOnsets -0.055 -5.4 -10.5 -0.034 -3.4 -6.6 
 (0.095)   (0.090)   
NeighborhoodViol -0.562 -43.0 -12.5 -0.700 -50.3 -15.2 
 (0.728)   (0.800)   
NeighborhoodNonviol 0.641 89.9 8.5 0.585 79.5 7.7 
 (0.878)   (0.966)   
Constant   -11.131***     -11.180***   
 (2.174)   (2.208)   
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Table 5 (continued) 
 Base   Base Model,   
 Model % %StdX excl. Nepal % %StdX 
2 (Violent Campaign Onset) 
       
NotFree 0.900 145.9  0.818 126.6  
 (0.889)   (0.899)   
ProximityAutocratization -0.417 -34.1 -9.5 -0.550 -42.3 -12.3 
 (0.714)   (0.723)   
NotFree*ProximityAutocrat -0.789 -54.6 -24.2 -0.668 -48.7 -21.0 
 (1.215)   (1.232)   
ProximityLiberalization 0.856 135.3 24.0 0.902 146.4 25.5 
 (0.600)   (0.609)   
rGDPpc -0.000 -0.0 -71.2 -0.000 -0.0 -70.8 
 (0.000)   (0.000)   
lnPopulation  0.279** 32.1 53.5  0.277** 32.0 53.5 
 (0.100)   (0.100)   
Military Personnel t-1 -0.000 0.0 -12.8 -0.000 -0.0 -12.3 
 (0.000)   (0.000)   
Election -0.037 -3.6  -0.009 -0.9  
 (0.295)   (0.295)   
Urbanization 0.011 1.1 27.7 0.011 1.1 28.2 
 (0.012)   (0.012)   
NonViolStabilityYears -0.013   -0.013   
 (0.114)   (0.121)   
NonViolStabilityYears2 0.003   0.003   
 (0.006)   (0.006)   
NonViolStabilityYears3 -0.000   -0.000   
 (0.000)   (0.000)   
ViolStabilityYears -0.053   -0.049   
 (0.085)   (0.088)   
ViolStabilityYears2 0.002   0.001   
 (0.005)   (0.005)   
ViolStabilityYears3 -0.000   -0.000   
 (0.000)   (0.000)   
NumberNonViolOnsets -0.009 -0.9 -2.8 -0.011 -1.1 -3.5 
 (0.059)   (0.059)   
NumberViolOnsets   0.302*** 35.3 83.9   0.298*** 34.7 82.2 
 (0.044)   (0.045)   
NeighborhoodViol 0.232 26.1 5.7 0.173 18.9 4.2 
 (0.554)   (0.565)   
NeighborhoodNonviol -0.540 -41.7 -6.7 -0.463 -37.1 -5.7 
 (1.227)   (1.233)   
Constant  -9.325***    -9.309***   
 (2.141)   (2.179)   
N 3274   3240   
Log pseudolikelihood 
Pseudo R2 
-535.25 
0.127 
  -521.50 
0.131 
  
Robust standard errors clustered on state in parentheses 
† p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
Note: % denotes percent change in odds of 1 unit increase in xi, %StdX denotes percent change in odds of 1 std increase in xi. 
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thesis to conduct a case study of Nepal, and therefore, because it is such a significant outlier, 
Nepal is excluded from the analysis.  
The second model in Table 5 shows the Base Model excluding Nepal. The results are 
largely the same – none of the estimated coefficients for the independent variables changed 
direction. However, the estimated effect of  Proximity to Liberation on nonviolent campaign 
onset is now significant at a 90 % confidence level, and close to the 95 % confidence (p = 
0.055). For nonviolent conflict onset, Proximity to Autocratization also approaches statistical 
significance at p= 0.127.  
These results suggest that the patterns from the distribution graphs were not in entirety 
driven by spurious effects. Liberalization in non-free states appears to have a substantial 
positive impact on the likelihood of nonviolent campaign onset, while there is more 
uncertainty connected to the estimated negative effect of autocratization, although it is 
negative as indicated by the distribution graphs. For violent conflict onset, neither variable 
has a significant effect, although the reported direction is as expected – positive for 
liberalization, and negative for autocratization.  
To further illuminate the relationship between the independent variables and 
nonviolent campaign onset, I have used the STATA software addition, CLARIFY
27
 (Tomz et 
al., 2003). Using the simulation techniques described by King et al. (2000), I calculated the 
effect of one standard deviation increase from the mean in the independent variables 
individually on the probability of nonviolent campaign onset.  
With all values held at their means, the simulated probability of nonviolent campaign 
onset per year is very low – only 0.99 percent. One standard deviation increase in Proximity 
to Liberalization raises the simulated probability of nonviolent campaign onset to 1.27 
percent
28
. The value of the mean plus one standard deviation increase is close to the value on 
the decay variable 1 year after liberalization, and the mean corresponds to somewhere 
between four and five years after liberalization
29
. In other words, when roughly one year has 
passed since liberalizing repressive change, and all other variables are at their means, the 
                                                 
27
 CLARIFY draws 1,000 sets of simulated parameters from their asymptotic sampling distribution. These are 
then converted into the quantities of interest, such as first differences, predicted values, or expected values.  
28
 When the dichotomous variables are held at zero, the result is very similar – the initial probability of 
nonviolent campaign being 0.95 percent, and the probability after one standard deviation increase from the mean 
in Proximity to Liberalization being 1.21 percent, yielding a 27.4 percent change in probability.  
29
 The mean of Proximity to Liberalization is 0.658, and the standard deviation is 0.252. Thus, the value 
producing the probability after increase is 0.910, which is fairly close to the value of the decay variable at 1 year 
after liberalization (0.917). In other words, the probabilities after increase are at a little over a year after 
liberalization. The mean, 0.658, corresponds to somewhere between four (0.707) and five (0.648) years after 
liberalization. 
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probability of nonviolent campaign onset is 1.27%.  For Proximity to Autocratization, one 
standard deviation
30
 increase reduces the probability of nonviolent campaign onset to 0.74 
percent
31
 - or, when the autocratization occurred between one and two years ago, the 
probability of nonviolent conflict onset that year is 0.74 percent.  
 These results reinforce the impression left by the models in Table 5. Although the 
substantive effects are not as precise as may be desirable, the simulated probabilities indicate 
that proximity to liberalization does have a positive effect on the likelihood of nonviolent 
conflict – or to give a hesitant response to the research question of this thesis; based on the 
simulated quantities of interest, it would appear that repressive instability influences the 
probability of nonviolent conflict, in non-free states between 1972 and 2006.  
Before the hypotheses are evaluated, additional insights from CLARIFY simulations 
should be highlighted. Figure 6 displays the effects of a one standard deviation increase from 
the mean
32
 on the probability of nonviolent campaign onset for all substantive variables
33
 in 
the Base Model, with a 90 percent CI cap
34
. The first difference effects – or percentage points 
change produced by a standard deviation increase in each independent variable – were also 
generated by simulations using CLARIFY. 
The largest effect on the probability of nonviolent campaign onset is provided by 
Number of Nonviolent Onsets. One standard deviation (3.2) increase from the mean (2.5) 
increases the annual probability of nonviolent campaign onset by 0.65 percentage points. In 
other words, when the number of global nonviolent conflicts in a given year goes up from 3 to 
about 5 or 6, the probability of nonviolent campaign onset in a given year increases by 0.65 
percentage points, all other variables held at their means. This indicates that the proposed 
relationship of diffusion finds support in this analysis as well.  
The second largest effect is produced by one standard deviation increase in 
lnPopulation, with an increase in annual probability of nonviolent campaign onset of 0.62 
percentage points. The positive relationship between large populations and increased 
likelihood of conflict onset is well-established, and this analysis confirms that phenomenon 
                                                 
30
 The mean for autocratization is 0.654, which corresponds to somewhere between four (0.707) and five (0.648) 
years after autocratization. The total value of the variable after one standard deviation increase, 0.895, 
corresponds to somewhere between one (0.917) and two (0.841) years after autocratization. 
31
 When the dichotomous variables are held at zero, the result is very similar – the probability after one standard 
deviation increase from the mean in Proximity to Liberalization being 0.70 percent, yielding a 27.4 percent 
change in probability from 0.95 percent. 
32
 Note that in this figure, all variables are held at their means.  
33
 Except the cubic polynomials. 
34
 The 90 percent confidence interval is chosen because of the relative rareness of nonviolent conflict.  
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also holds true in an analysis restricted to non-free states (Butcher & Svensson, 2014; 
Chenoweth & Lewis, 2013d; Chenoweth & Ulfelder, 2015). 
Election also appears to have a relatively strong effect on the probability of nonviolent 
campaign onset, but this effect is probably underestimated as it is dichotomous, and mean and 
standard deviation don’t make much sense. The effect of one standard deviation increase in 
the Election variable on the annual probability of nonviolent campaign onset is reported at 
0.46 percentage points.  
However, as the variable is dichotomous, and a value of 0.63 on Election is 
nonsensical, its effect is likely greater. To investigate this, I ran the analysis again, setting the 
binary variables at 0. With all other variables at their means, the annual probability of 
nonviolent campaign onset in non-election years is 0.95 percent. In other words, in partly free 
states in non-election years, with mean values on the other variables, the probability of 
nonviolent campaign onset is 0.95 percent. However, in election years, the annual probability 
increases to 2.2 percent, which equals a 1.25 percentage point increase. This indicates that 
election years may indeed provide a focal point for an aggrieved population, as suggested by 
Tucker (2007), and that the politicized momentum may indeed be the mechanism that 
increases the probability of nonviolent campaign onset in partly free states (Beissinger, 2007, 
2013; Tucker, 2007).  
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Figure 6 First differences, the effect of a one standard deviation increase on the probability of nonviolent 
campaign onset, 1972-2006 
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None of the other controls yield significant changes to the annual probability of nonviolent 
conflict onset in the CLARIFY simulations presented above. As in other quantitative studies 
of nonviolent conflict onset (e.g.,Chenoweth & Lewis, 2013d; Chenoweth & Ulfelder, 2015; 
Cunningham, 2013) GDP per capita does not have a significant influence on the annual 
likelihood of nonviolent campaign onset in the present model. More interestingly, neither do 
Military Personnelt-1 nor Urbanization. I find no significant effect on the annual probability of 
nonviolent campaign onset of the size of the armed forces in non-free states, nor is the 
proposition that urbanized countries are more prone to nonviolent conflict onset supported, 
which is consistent with the findings in the analysis by Butcher and Svensson (2014: 17). The 
neighborhood variables are not significant either, but it is possible that their effect is captured 
by the measures of annual global nonviolent and violent campaign onsets.  
Still, there is more information to gain from the CLARIFY simulations. Setting all 
independent variables at their means does not extract as poignant clues to the effect of 
proximity to liberalization as is possible. First, it might be interesting to discover different 
effects of one standard deviation increase in Proximity to Liberalization on simulated 
probability in Partly Free states and in Not Free states.  
Setting the binary NotFree and Election variables to zero yields the annual simulated 
probability for campaign onset in partly free states in nonelection years, with all other 
variables set at their means. Thus, in states that remain only partly free between four and five 
years after liberalizing repressive change, in nonelection years, the simulated probability of 
nonviolent campaign onset that year is 0.95%, and the simulated probability of violent 
campaign onset is 0.75 %. However, states that remain partly free approximately one year 
after the liberalization have a simulated probability of 1.21 % for nonviolent campaign onset 
in that year, and 0.95 % for violent campaign onset. In other words, going from one year after 
liberalization to four to five years after liberalization decreases the probability of nonviolent 
campaign onset by 0.26 percentage points when the regime keeps a stable value in the middle 
of the civil liberties scale.   
 For states with a 6 or a 7 on the civil liberties scale four to five years after 
liberalization, in nonelection years, the simulated probability of nonviolent campaign onset is 
0.77%, and the probability of violent campaign onset is 1.83 %. For states with a 6 or 7 
approximately one year after liberalization, the simulated probability of nonviolent campaign 
onset is 0.99 %, while it is 2.35 % for violent campaign onset. As for states that keep a stable 
value in the middle range of the CL scale after liberalization, regimes that remain stable in the 
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NotFree
35
 category after liberalization have a much higher annual probability of conflict onset 
approximately one year after liberalization than four to five years after liberalization. 
However, the simulated annual probabilities indicate that the annual probability of violent 
conflict onset is consistently higher than the annual probability of nonviolent conflict onset.  
 There are mainly two interesting features with these simulated probabilities. First, the 
simulated annual probabilities of conflict onset increase when proximity to liberalization is 
increased, both in states that are partly free and in states that are not free. Second, in states 
that are still highly repressive after liberalization, the probability of violent conflict is higher 
than the probability of nonviolent conflict, while the opposite holds true for partly free states. 
This is not reflected by the estimated effects in Table 5, but is nevertheless interesting. The 
most compelling feature of these substantive effects is that in the early aftermath
36
 of 
liberalization, there is an increased simulated likelihood of nonviolent campaign onset.  
In order to properly answer the research question ‘does repressive instability increase 
the likelihood of nonviolent conflict onset?’ the hypotheses from Chapter 4 are evaluated 
based on the results from the multinomial regression analyses and the CLARIFY simulations.  
There are two tested hypotheses concerning the relationship between liberalization and 
conflict onset. The first, H1, states that liberalization should increase the likelihood of conflict 
onset in general. As I find no conclusive evidence that the probability of violent campaign 
onset is positively affected by Proximity to Liberalization, I retain the null hypothesis that 
liberalization does not have a significant positive effect on the likelihood of conflict onset, 
and reject H1.  
 The second tested Liberalization-hypothesis, H3, is more specific, and proposes a 
positive relationship between liberalization and the probability of nonviolent conflict onset. In 
the Base Model excluding Nepal, the estimated effect of Proximity to Liberalization on 
nonviolent campaign onset is positive and significant at 90 percent confidence level. As 
described above, the marginal effect of one standard deviation increase in Proximity to 
Liberalization raises the simulated probability of nonviolent campaign onset to 1.27 percent. 
Thus, there is support for H3, and the null hypothesis that no significant positive relationship 
between liberalization and nonviolent conflict onset can be rejected with 90 % certainty.  
                                                 
35
 This necessarily indicates that the value on the CL scale is 6, as liberalization has occurred, and thus a value of 
7 is impossible.  
36
 Reminder: The mean of Proximity to Liberalization is 0.658, and the standard deviation is 0.252. Thus, the 
value producing the probability after increase is 0.910, which is fairly close to the value of the decay variable at 
1 year after liberalization (0.917). In other words, the probabilities are given a year and some months after 
liberalization. The mean, 0.658, corresponds to somewhere between four (0.707) and five (0.648) years after 
liberalization.  
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 The remaining two tested hypotheses are concerned with the relationship between 
autocratization and the probability of conflict onset. Recalling the discussion in Chapter 4, 
section 4.4, the first of these hypotheses, H5, is essentially the POS-argument that repression 
is a constraining factor which reduces the likelihood of conflict. While the estimated 
coefficient for Proximity to Autocratization is negative both for nonviolent and violent 
campaign onset, neither parameter estimate is significant at conventional levels. For major 
maximalist nonviolent campaign onsets, the estimated effect approaches statistical 
significance, but the uncertainty regarding this finding is too great to reject the null 
hypothesis. Therefore I retain the null hypothesis that no significant negative relationship 
exists between autocratization and the probability of conflict onset.  
 Finally, H6 proposed that autocratization toward extreme levels of repression 
decreases the likelihood of conflict. In other words, if the autocratization causes the level of 
repression to be all-encompassing and pervasive, no opportunities for conflict exist and thus 
the likelihood of conflict onset is reduced by this effect. The interaction term in the Base 
Model tests this. Its coefficient is nowhere near significant for nonviolent campaign onset, nor 
for violent campaign onset
37
. Thus, I reject H6 and retain the null hypothesis that the level of 
repression autocratization leads into does not have an interaction with autocratization 
producing reduced probability of campaign onset.  
 Thus, on the basis of the main model in the analysis, only one hypothesis is retained 
with any degree of certainty – it does appear that liberalization increases the likelihood of 
nonviolent campaign onset. The next section tests the robustness of this finding, and the 
efficiency and predictive power of the model.  
6.3 Testing the Model  
To evaluate the estimates and the model used in this analysis, I first conduct robustness tests 
to assess the sensitivity of the results. The next section addresses the model’s goodness of fit, 
evaluating the efficacy and in-sample predictive power. These last tests indicate whether the 
model is a good fit to the data, and provide an opportunity to compare the relative efficiency 
and explanatory powers of the models.  
                                                 
37
 Because of the extreme uncertainty regarding these estimates, I have not focused on their directions for 
nonviolent and violent conflict. The confidence interval is very wide for both coefficients, and thus the relevance 
of the direction seems less interesting.  
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6.3.1 Robustness  
To assess the sensitivity of the estimations reported in Table 5, I conduct a number of 
robustness tests. First, two additional models are specified. The simplified model contains 
only the independent variables, no controls. The expanded model contains two additional 
parameters, RegimeChange1to3 and Fuel Exports, as well as regional dummies to control for 
regional differences. The West/Europe is set as the reference category.  
 Second, alternate specifications of the repression dummies, Free and NotFree, are 
substituted for the originals. To assess whether the specification drives the analysis, I generate 
two more dummies, where units with a 1 on the Civil Liberties (CL) scale from Freedom 
House receives a 1 on altFree, all else set to 0, and where 1 on the dummy altNotFree is 
given to units with a CL value of 7. This includes all units with a 2 on the CL scale in the 
analysis, increasing the N of the analysis. Additionally, the interaction term between 
Proximity to Autocratization and altNotFree may be more theoretically valid, as the ‘extreme 
repressive level’ specified in the hypothesis may be better captured by a value of 7 on the CL 
scale than both values of 6
38
 and 7. The results of the robustness tests are reported below.  
Simplified and Expanded Models 
To test the models reported in Table 5, I first ran a simplified model with only independent 
variables, with the same exclusions as the main model. The resulting models can be examined 
in Appendix Table 6. The estimated effects on nonviolent conflict are very similar to those of 
the Base Model excluding Nepal. The coefficient for Proximity to Autocratization is still 
negative, but is now significant at .001-level. The interaction term between Proximity to 
Autocration and Not Free is now negative, but remains far from acceptable significance 
levels. Finally, in the simplified model, the Proximity to Liberalization is not significant. The 
differences between the simplified model and the base model are probably explained by 
omitted variable bias in the simplified model, biasing the effects and standard errors.   
 The results from an expanded model including the measure of RegimeChange1to3, the 
dummy for Fuel Exports, and regional dummies, are encouraging. For the probability of 
nonviolent conflict, the coefficient for Proximity to Liberalization reaches a stricter 
significance level. Additionally, Proximity to Liberalization has a larger effect upon the 
probability of nonviolent conflict in the expanded model. In other words, the results from the 
                                                 
38
 A 6 on the CL scale does reflect a high level of repressiveness, but not as pervasive as a 7. 
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Base Model are robust, even when controlled for regime change in the previous three years, 
and regional effects. Thus, it does not appear that the effect of proximity to liberalization is 
solely based on regional differences, nor a side-effect of regime change. This then, supports 
the rejection of the null hypothesis of H3, and strengthens credibility that the base model 
estimated effects were not driven by omitted variable bias. 
 Interestingly, in the expanded model, the effect of Proximity to Autocratization on the 
probability of nonviolent conflict is negative and significant at 0.1-level. These increased 
levels of significance could be driven by the reduced unexplained variance and thus altered 
scale of the parameters (Train, 2003: 45). The explained variance remains relatively low, 
which admittedly is a weakness of the models, but which in the interest of parsimony and 
absence of established good models for nonviolent conflict onset I leave to future researchers 
to amend. Neither parameters’ estimates are significant for violent conflict, nor is the 
interaction term, which remains below desired levels of confidence. In other words, the 
expanded model including a control for RegimeChange1to3, a dummy variable for Fuel 
Exports, and regional dummies do not alter the evaluation of the hypotheses, but rather 
strengthens the confidence in the rejection of all save H3.   
Alternative Specifications of the Dummy Variables of Repression  
It could be argued that alternative specifications of the Free and NotFree dummies may be 
warranted. While the current specification of a CL value of 6-7 in NotFree and 1-2 in Free 
may mask effects at the extreme values on the CL scale. I therefore rerun my models with 
new specifications of the dummies, giving the value 1 on altFree for a CL value of 1, and 
zero for all other values, and the value 1 on altNotFree for a CL value of 7, zero for all else. 
The resultant models are interesting, and can be inspected  in Appendix Table 7. 
 First, for the probability of nonviolent campaign onset, the coefficient for the 
interaction term between altNotFree and Proximity to Autocratization is large and negative. 
In the Base Model, it is significant at 90 percent confidence level (p = 0.075), and it 
approaches significance in the Expanded model (p = 0.103). This indicates that when the 
increased level of repression effectively makes the state an extremely repressive state
39
, 
conflict is less likely to ensue. Compared to the estimate for the Proximity to Autocratization, 
which remains negative and insignificant, this is interesting. In the previous models, it 
approached statistical significance, but in the Base Model and Expanded Model with 
                                                 
39
 With a civil liberties value of 7.  
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alternative specifications, it is nowhere close to any conventional standards of significance at 
p = 0.520 and p= 0.568, respectively. This suggests that the original specification disguised 
the moderating effect of extreme repression on the effect of Proximity to Autocratization. 
However, as this finding is very sensitive, I opt to act on the side of caution and retain the null 
hypothesis of H6 in this analysis. Nevertheless, the results from these alternative 
specifications are interesting, and may be an avenue for future research.   
Finally, for the probability of nonviolent conflict onset, the estimated effect of 
Proximity to Liberalization remains positive and significant at 90 percent confidence level for 
all models, and approaches 95 percent confidence level in the Base Model with alternative 
specifications. This further strengthens the rejection of H3’s null hypothesis.  
 Overall, the robustness checks do not challenge the findings from the Base Model. The 
next section will assess which models provide the best efficacy, and which model is the best 
at predicting outcome correctly.  
6.3.2 Goodness of Fit 
While the robustness checks above tests the estimations for sensitivity to alternate 
specifications, the explanatory power of the independent variables should also be tested. The 
level of statistical significance may not reflect an indicators predictive power, and the 
empirical fit of the models is highly relevant to the validity of the estimations. The models’ 
ability to explain variations in the data indicates their explanatory power. To assess the 
empirical fit of the models in this analysis, I rely on two heuristics: Aikake’s Information 
Criterion (AIC), and Receiver Operating Characteristics (ROC) curves.  
Aikake’s Information Criterion (AIC) 
The AIC is commonly used to evaluate the efficiency of a model, given a set of data. While it 
is comparable to a LR-test, the AIC has some crucial advantages. First, while the LR-test is 
affected positively by the inclusion of additional parameters, the AIC penalizes additional 
variables, which reduces the likelihood of overestimating the efficiency of an expanded 
model. In other words, the AIC takes into account the trade-off between goodness of fit and 
overly complex models, indirectly rewarding parsimony. Second, the AIC allows models to 
be un-nested, and for comparisons across different models for the same data material. Smaller 
values should, all else being equal, suggest a better fitting model (Long, 1997: 109-110). 
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 Table 6 shows the AIC values for all models in this thesis, including those from the 
robustness checks. The Base Model includes both the independent variables and the control 
variables specified under 5.2.3 and 5.2.4 in Chapter 5. To discover the relative efficiency of 
this main model and the relevance of the independent variables, I also calculate the AIC 
values of the Base Model without the independent variables, keeping only the controls. To 
evaluate the efficiency of adding controls, Table 6 also reports the AIC values of a simplified 
model in which only the effects of the independent variables on campaign onset are estimated. 
Finally, the AIC values of an expanded model, including additional controls and regional 
dummies are included to evaluate whether these additions add efficiency to the model. All 
models have four AIC values in Table 6 – the AIC value is calculated for the models run with 
all non-free units, and for estimations excluding Nepal, both with the original specifications 
of Not Free and Free from 5.2.3 in Chapter 5, and with the alternate specifications described 
in the robustness checks above.  
The first notable pattern is that the models excluding Nepal are generally more 
efficient than their comparable counterparts. In other words, excluding Nepal from the 
analysis improves the fit of the models. The Base Model with original specifications of Not 
Free and Free, excluding Nepal, has the overall lowest AIC value, although the AIC of the 
Expanded Model with the same conditions is fairly close.  
 
Table 6 AIC values, all models 
 Original Specifications of 
Free & NotFree 
Alternate Specifications of 
Free & NotFree* 
Model All Units Excl. Nepal All Units Excl. Nepal 
Base Model 1150.5 1123.0 1189.9 1163.1 
Base Model, Controls Only 1164.6 1139.7 1208.7 1183.5 
Simplified Model 1405.9 1376.1 1467.2 1437.6 
Expanded Model 1152.4 1124.3 1201.6 1175.1 
 
Notes: All models exclude all units with Free = 1.  
* Extreme values of the CL-scale. altFree = 1 if CL = 1, altNotFree = 1 if CL = 7.  
 
In fact, all for all four sets of AIC values, the Base Model including independent 
variables has the lowest AIC value. The Expanded Model is fairly close in the two sets of AIC 
with original specifications of the repressive dummies, and the penalization of additional 
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parameters probably accounts for its higher AIC value. Nevertheless, this suggests that the 
Base Model is not a markedly poorer fit than the Expanded Model, and that the additions in 
the specification of the Expanded Model do not improve the fit to data. 
The Base Model ran excluding the independent variables with only controls has a 
consistently higher AIC value compared with the Base Model including the independent 
variables. This suggests that the inclusion of the independent variables improves the fit and 
efficiency of the model. Likewise, the consistent relatively high AIC values for the Simplified 
Model with only independent variables across all specifications and exclusions indicate that 
the inclusion of the control variables in the Base Model improves the fit of the model 
markedly.  
The alternate specifications of the two repression dummies do not improve the fit of 
the model – all AIC values with alternate specifications are higher than those with original 
specifications. Thus, the Base Model with the original specifications of the repression 
dummies and excluding Nepal provides the best overall fit to the data.  
Receiver Operating Characteristics (ROC) Curves 
ROC plots
40
 visualize the in-sample predictive power of the models. The curves display the 
relationship between the true positives rate and the false positives rate at different thresholds 
for the models. The true positives 
rate is the number of correctly 
predicted conflict onsets over the 
actual number of units with onsets in 
the data. The false positives rate is 
the number of incorrectly predicted 
onsets over all units with no conflict 
onset in the data. The x-axis in the 
curves is the false positives rate, 
with the y-axis representing the true 
positives rate (Greenhill, Ward, & 
Sacks, 2011: 992). Thus, curves for 
                                                 
40
 To generate these ROC plots, I have used the mlogitroc command in STATA, which is made available online 
as a software addition.  
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models that are adept at predicting 
correctly should be drawn up in the 
top left corner of the grid.  
The area beneath the curve, 
the ‘AUC-score’, can therefore be 
interpreted as the model’s overall 
predictive power, with a value of 1 
indicating perfect predictive power, 
and a value of 0.5 signifying that the 
model gets as many predictions wrong 
as correct for each threshold (Greenhill 
et al., 2011: 992).  
 I have generated ROC curves 
for four models, all excluding Nepal, 
with the original specifications of 
Free and Not Free, displayed in 
Figures 7, 8, 9, and 10. 
 The Base Model in Figure 8 
clearly performs better than the 
simplified model in Figure 7, as its 
curve is more drawn towards the 
upper left corner of the graph. The 
AUC score is also markedly higher 
for the Base Model, suggesting that 
including the control variables 
improves the rate of true positives 
over the rate of false positives – or 
the in-sample predictive power of the 
model.  
 Likewise, the model 
excluding the independent variables 
in Figure 9 is less adept at predicting 
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campaign onset correctly than the full base model including the independent variables, 
suggesting that the inclusion of the independent variables improves the model’s predictive 
power. The difference between the two is not as great as between the model with only 
independent variables and the full main model, but as the AUC approaches 1 we should 
expect more modest adjustments. It suggests that the independent variables at least have a 
modest effect on the in-sample predictive power of the model.  
 Finally, the expanded model in Figure 10 with the additional control variables – 
RegimeChange1to3, Fuel Exports, and the regional dummies yields the highest AUC score, 
and thus performs the best at correctly predicting conflict onset relative to falsely predicting 
conflict onset of the four models. This may be because the Expanded Model is better suited to 
the violent campaign onsets, and therefore performs better in terms of predicting violent 
conflict onset than the other three.  
6.3.3 Assessing the Model 
The Base Model performs reasonably well across all these tests. The estimates are largely 
robust to the inclusion of additional variables, and although the alternative specifications of 
the repression dummies did change the estimates, the AIC values indicate that the Base Model 
with the original specifications is more efficient. The ROC-curves indicate that the expanded 
model including additional controls and region dummies has better predictive power than the 
Base Model, but since the estimates for the independent variables do not substantively differ 
between the two models – in both models Proximity to Liberalization is positive and 
significant for nonviolent campaign onset, and Proximity to Autocratization is negative 
(though it does reach the lowest conventional level of significance in the expanded model, 
while it is only approaching significance in the base model), and none of the independent 
variables have any significant effects on the probability of violent campaign onset – this is not 
of great concern. Furthermore, the fact that additional variables were included, and thus the 
parameter scale changed, may account for the larger estimated effects and overall increased 
significance of the independent variables. The AIC values indicate that the Base Model is a 
better fit to the data.  
While predictive power is desired, adding too many control variables may result in 
overfitting the model, making it less applicable outside the sample it was fitted for. As several 
of the hypotheses in this analysis are left untested due to lack of data, this is not an ideal 
situation. Preferably, the models should be capable of explaining contemporary nonviolent 
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conflicts not included in their datasets, such as those of the Arab Spring, as well as future 
conflicts. While I do not expect the hypothesis that liberalization induces conflict to hold in 
all circumstances, it may be a fruitful inclusion to models rather than the static measure of 
repression often used.  I leave this, as well, for future researchers to assess.  
6.4 Summary 
This chapter has presented the empirical assessment of four of the seven hypotheses posited 
based on the grievance-opportunity framework. Only one, H3, of the four receives confident 
empirical support – the empirical analysis in this thesis suggests that proximity to 
liberalization does increase the likelihood of nonviolent conflict, in somewhat repressive 
states. In my models, as in other quantitative studies of nonviolent and violent campaign 
onset, I find that there are significant differences between the two types of campaigns. While 
the relationship between proximity to liberalization and nonviolent conflict onset is 
significant, it is not so for violent conflict onset, consistent with H3, which proposed that 
certain features of nonviolent campaigns make them more likely in the aftermath of 
liberalization.  
 The next, and final, chapter will offer a summary view of the thesis, including its 
limitations, before outlining the possible avenues for future research.   
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7 Final Thoughts  
It was the goal of this thesis to further contribute to the nascent quantitative study of the 
causes of nonviolent conflict, as well as offer a new suggested solution to the ‘Punishment 
Puzzle’, by answering the research question does repressive instability increase the 
likelihood of nonviolent conflict? To that end, an integrated theoretical framework of 
grievance theory and the political opportunity structure approach was offered as an alternative 
to the common oppositional depiction of these theories. Rather than emphasizing either 
grievances or political opportunities as the definitive origin of dissent, I suggest that conflict 
onset is a function of the two, and that changes in either factor could be the trigger for 
conflict. Seven hypotheses were derived from the framework, four of which were tested using 
multinomial logistic regression.  
 I found fairly strong support for the hypothesis
41
 that liberalization of repression 
increases the likelihood of nonviolent conflict. Conversely, the statistical model applied in 
this analysis could not produce conclusive support
42
 for the remaining three hypotheses 
tested. It may be that the specifications of the models, or the lack of data available, are the 
origins of this uncertainty, and I would encourage others to build upon my work. 
Nevertheless, in the spirit of Karl Popper, I choose to err on the side of caution, and retain 
only the hypothesis supported by statistical significance. Within this line of thinking, there are 
certain limitations of the present analysis that the reader should include in their consideration 
of this conclusion. 
 First, the dataset in this analysis is restricted. While data for global nonviolent and 
violent campaigns is available between 1945 and 2006 in the NAVCO 2.0 dataset, there is 
less availability of data on repression. For this analysis, the Civil Liberties scale from 
Freedom House was applied. The Freedom in the World dataset only contains annual 
information for all independent states between 1972 and 2014, which restricts the time period 
in the analysis to 1972 to 2006, about half the time span of the NAVCO data. The numbers of 
major maximalist nonviolent and violent campaigns in the analysis were constrained by this
43
, 
though a larger proportion of nonviolent campaigns were retained relative to the proportion of 
                                                 
41
 Or rather, I found no grounds to retain my null hypothesis that liberalization does not have a positive and 
significant effect on nonviolent conflict.  
42
 Or rather, could not falsify their null hypotheses.  
43
 There are 74 major, maximalist nonviolent campaign onsets and 73 major, maximalist violent campaign onsets 
in the resultant dataset, with a total of 3,929 units of analysis. In the original NAVCO 2.0 dataset, there are 150 
violent and 100 nonviolent campaigns.  
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violent campaigns. In other words, the basis for analysis is somewhat better for nonviolent 
campaign onset than for violent campaign onset.  
 Second, the NAVCO 2.0 data are not without concerns. As noted upon in Chapter 5, 
several aspects are noteworthy
44
. The primary concern may be the inclusion rules, and their 
implication for comparison of nonviolent and violent campaigns. While the threshold of 1,000 
participants does diminish the issue of underreporting bias
45
, it remains unclear whether the 
comparability of 1,000 participants in nonviolent campaigns to 1,000 participants, derived 
from the number of battle-related deaths, in violent campaigns is sufficient. It is an issue on 
which I have chosen to rely on the expertise and consensus of the scholars and experts 
involved in constructing the NAVCO 2.0 dataset, but which nevertheless should be remarked 
upon as a potential flaw of the present analysis. As it is, the analysis and its subsequent 
conclusions are restricted to major campaigns, with maximalist goals.  
 This last feature of the inclusion rules – maximalist goals – may be more harmful for 
this analysis than it is for others. The theoretical framework does not specify which types of 
goals the dissidents are likely to have – and admittedly, they may have all three specified by 
Chenoweth and Lewis (2013d) – but it is a fair argument that dissidence in the wake of 
repressive change may be most likely to purport goals of regime change or reform. This 
especially rings true if the repression is posited as the grievance. Reformist campaigns are not 
included in the NAVCO 2.0 dataset, and due to the already challenging lack of data, it is 
imprudent to limit the analysis to those campaigns with a goal of overthrowing the ruling 
regime. These factors may have confounded the findings reported in Chapter 6, and are 
deserving of future academic attention. With that said, there is no reason that the mechanism 
of repressive change should not influence dissidents who wish to remove a foreign occupier 
or who desire secession, albeit perhaps more likely solely as an opening or constraining 
factor, as the grievance is already specified.  
 Third, the concept of repression is far more complex than the operationalization in this 
analysis is able to reflect. Because no satisfactory measure of personal integrity repression is 
available, it was not included in the analysis. This is not as severely limiting as other issues, 
because the theoretical framework and hypotheses are more inclined towards civil liberties 
repression instability. Nevertheless, it would be an interesting avenue of future research, in 
                                                 
44
 For a full discussion of these, I refer back to section 5.1.1 Notes on NAVCO 2.0 and the Dependent Variable, 
Chapter 5.  
45
 Which remains significant, and potentially harmful.  
  
 
84 
 
the event that data on personal integrity repression suitable for measuring instability becomes 
available.  
 Furthermore, the Civil Liberties scale from Freedom House, while being the chosen 
measure of repression, is an aggregated scale prone to subjectivity and contextual 
specification issues. However, I do not consider the CL scale to be any more plagued with 
these issues than other aggregated scales, and the open and consensus based  Freedom House 
methodology greatly relieves the issue of subjectivity. All the same, readers should keep in 
mind that the scale on which the independent variables are based is not a completely objective 
measure of repression, although the idea of an objective scale in the case of an inherently 
complex and subjective concept such as ‘repression’ is slightly fictional46. 
 Fourth, the explained variance is fairly low across the statistical models. In lieu of 
established decisively good models for nonviolent campaign onset, this is to be expected. 
Additionally, the low variance may be a figment produced by the artificiality of the time 
aspect in the analysis. While annual analyses are common in conflict research, our explained 
variance would increase if the time aspect were longer – say 10 years – and conversely, lower 
should we chose a shorter time frame.   
Taking all these aspects into account, the analysis is still not without its strengths. As 
with all quantitative analyses, its generalizability, though limited by insufficient data, is far 
greater than any case study. Furthermore, the results are robust to alternate specifications, as 
well as to the inclusion of additional control variables. Finally, the Base Model
47
 performs 
reasonably well compared to the other models in both efficacy and prediction rate, which 
implies a relatively sound internal validity. As the explained variance is still fairly low, 
however, there may still be some room for improvement in this respect. 
Thus, based on the results from the multinomial regression analyses, and the model 
diagnostics, it appears that the answer to the research question is that for all independent, non-
free states except Nepal between 1972 and 2006, repressive instability – as the liberalization 
of civil liberties repression – does increase the likelihood of major maximalist nonviolent 
campaign onset, both where the outset is highly repressive and those where it is less so. This 
is interesting, because one of the hypotheses that remain untested specified that the level of 
repression pre liberalization mattered. While this analysis does not provide a basis for 
                                                 
46
 After all, repression must always be relational to some ideal of ‘liberal’ – a state is repressive to the degree 
that it is not permissive of certain defined and ideal liberties.  
47
 Excluding Nepal. 
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evaluating the relevance of pre-liberalization repression level, it does suggest that in any non-
free state, liberalization increases the likelihood of conflict. 
Conservatively, there is some degree of support for the argument that opening change 
in the political opportunity structure produces conflict. It would appear that when dissidents 
face a moderately to very repressive regime that seek to mend its ways, the opening 
opportunity structure increases the probability of nonviolent campaigns arising. Furthermore, 
the proximity to the liberalization matters – major maximalist nonviolent campaigns are more 
likely to occur in the immediate aftermath of the liberalization.  
These results speak to both the literature on state repression and dissent, and to the 
quantitative research of the causes of nonviolent conflict. While the former is an established 
branch of comparative statistical conflict analyses, the latter is still developing. We do not yet 
know as much about the origins of nonviolent dissent as we do violent. What we do know is 
that there seems to be fundamental differences in their causes, as well as in their success rates 
(Chenoweth & Lewis, 2013d; Chenoweth & Stephan, 2011; Chenoweth & Ulfelder, 2015). 
This subsidiary finding is also confirmed here, although there are still great gaps left open for 
analysis as to what makes violent and nonviolent campaign onset differ.  
Furthermore, Chapter 4 argued for an integration of two of the most prominent 
branches of theory in conflict studies – grievance theory and political opportunity structure 
approaches (Gurr, 1968, 1970; Tarrow, 1998). Like Shadmehr (2014), I argue that the theories 
are complementary rather than opposing, and propose a grievance-opportunity function, in 
which changes in either increases the likelihood of conflict onset. I believe this approach both 
to be consistent with the original theories, as well as fruitful for future research.  
Finally, this thesis sought to contribute to the illumination of the ‘Punishment Puzzle’ 
described by Davenport (2007a:8) – while the effect of dissent on repression is established as 
positive, despite a plethora of research no conclusive answer has been made to the question of 
the effect of repression upon dissent. As I argued in Chapters 3 and 4, this phenomenon may 
have a fairly intuitive answer. While the repression measured in dissent-upon-repression 
research is responsive, repression-upon-dissent analyses must take into account the many-
faceted nature of the concept. The search for one consistent effect of repression on dissent 
may be futile, considering that repression can be deterrent or coercive, preemptive or 
responsive, overt or covert. Depending on what is surveyed, the results should be expected to 
differ. I argue that the grievance-opportunity function of change may provide an opportunity 
to focus on the changes in preemptive levels of repression, and find partial support for this. 
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As indicated above, this thesis leaves exciting avenues of research open for future 
research, in the advent of increased data availability. First and foremost, the conditional 
hypotheses left untested in this thesis due to insufficient data deserve attention from future 
scholars interested in the relationship between repression and dissent. The lack of data 
precluded them from the present analysis, but both their theoretical foundation and the 
possible implications should they prove to be supported empirically are intriguing. While 
repression research has largely been focused on repression as a responsive governmental 
behavior, the theoretical framework presented here argues that it also has a deterrent and 
proactive dimension. In relation to the finding in this analysis that major maximalist 
nonviolent campaign onset is made more likely in the aftermath of civil liberties liberalization 
in non-free states, it would certainly be interesting to investigate whether the initial repressive 
level makes a difference in probability of conflict onset – as predicted by Alexis de 
Tocqueville in 1859, and hypothesized but left untested here.  
 Second, as mentioned, the mechanism of repressive change is restricted to civil 
liberties repression in this analysis, which leaves interesting possibilities for future research. 
First, personal integrity repression could be included in the theoretical conflict function, 
although that was beyond the scope of this thesis. If data become available, a test of whether 
there are significant differences between changes in civil liberties repression and personal 
integrity repression with regards to the probability of conflict onset would be interesting.  
Finally, the findings in this thesis are restricted with regards to external validity. 
Several limitations have been placed upon the conclusions that could reasonably be drawn 
based on the data material and methods available. Replication and improvements on the 
model to further assess the strength and plausibility of the suggested relationship between 
liberalization and conflict onset would be welcome. A new iteration of the NAVCO data is in 
the coming, and thus opportunities to test the reliability and external validity of the findings 
presented here should be plentiful.  
As a final note, I would like to emphasize that this thesis does not attempt to fully 
explain all contention, nor is it able to. It does, however, contribute a small piece of a large 
and ever-changing puzzle, which in and of itself is sufficient justification for the endeavor. 
Discovering one unitary conflict explanation is quite probably impossible. However, that does 
not diminish the value of every single contribution to our collective understanding of what 
conditions promote conflict – the knowledge that it is complicated, diffuse, and perhaps 
ultimately unpredictable, should only further encourage the search for puzzle pieces. 
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Appendix 
 
 
Appendix Table 1 Frequency Table for Dichotomous Variables, All Units 
Variable  0 1 N Missing 
Not Free 3,857 1,479 5,336 4 
Liberalization 4,672 495 5,167 173 
Autocratization 4,801 366 5,167 173 
Election 3,950 1,292 5,242 98 
Fuelt-1 (33% of exports) 4,170 848 5,018 322 
 
Notes: For all state-years, 169 states, 1972-2006 
 
 
 
Appendix Table 2 Summary Statistics for Continous Variables, All Units 
Variable  Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max N Missing 
ProximitytoLiberalization 0.63 0.27 0.057 1 5,167 173 
ProximitytoAutocratization 0.60 0.26 0.057 1 5,167 173 
lnPopulation  15.89 1.61 11.77 20.99 5,301 39 
Real GDP per capita 8,257.85 10,372.88 160.93 81515.41 4,993 347 
Military Personnelt-1 164.95 442.97 0 4750 5,252 88 
Urbanization 48.33 24.12 2.72 100 5,144 196 
NumberNonViol 2.50 3.19 0 16 5,340 - 
NumberViol 2.19 2.01 0 9 5,340 - 
NeighborhoodViol 0.19 0.25 0 1 4,826 514 
NeighborhoodNonviol 0.05 0.13 0 1 4,826 514 
RegimeChange1to3 0.44 3.08 -18 18 5,210 130 
       
 
Notes: For all state-years, 169 states, 1972-2006. 
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Appendix Table 3 Auxillary Model, First Approach 
 
  
 (1) 
Auxillary Model, First Approach 
 0 (no campaign onset, ref.cat) 
 1 (Nonviolent campaign onset) 2 (Violent campaign onset) 
   
NochangeNOTFREE  (ref.cat) (ref.cat) 
NochangeFREE -2.008
*
 -1.385 
 (0.917) (1.328) 
NochangePARTLYFREE -0.589 -1.510
**
 
 (0.415) (0.552) 
ChangeFREEtoPARTLY -14.595
***
 -15.338
***
 
 (0.764) (0.829) 
ChangeFREEtoNOT -12.842
***
 -13.522
***
 
 (0.849) (0.908) 
ChangePARTLYtoFREE -14.605
***
 -14.707
***
 
 (0.631) (0.747) 
ChangePARTLYtoNOT 0.589 -14.779
***
 
 (1.146) (0.514) 
ChangeNOTtoPARTLY 0.712 -0.217 
 (0.728) (0.973) 
ChangeNOTtoFREE -13.143
***
 -16.541
***
 
 (1.476) (1.311) 
lnPopulation 0.264
+
 0.405
+
 
 (0.137) (0.216) 
Election 0.948
**
 0.785
+
 
 (0.298) (0.425) 
Military Personnel 0.000 -0.001 
 (0.000) (0.001) 
Nvstabyrs -0.001 0.020 
 (0.011) (0.017) 
Vstabyrs -0.007 -0.024 
 (0.015) (0.019) 
NumberNonviolOnset 0.132
***
 -0.079 
 (0.030) (0.071) 
NumViolOnset -0.215
+
 0.354
***
 
 (0.117) (0.071) 
Urbanization 0.019
*
 0.038
**
 
 (0.010) (0.015) 
Fuel Exports -0.747
+
 -0.569 
 (0.402) (0.703) 
realGDPpc -0.000 -0.000
*
 
 (0.000) (0.000) 
Neighborhood_viol 0.461 1.075 
 (0.611) (0.838) 
Neighborhood_nonviol -0.083 1.303 
 (1.222) (1.378) 
Constant -8.877
***
 -12.024
**
 
 (2.408) (3.715) 
N 2917 
Standard errors in parentheses 
+
 p < 0.10, 
*
 p < 0.05, 
**
 p < 0.01, 
***
 p < 0.001 
Notes: NochangeNOTFREE reference category.   
79 observations completely determined.  Standard errors questionable. 
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Appendix Table 4 VIF Test, Base Model Independent Variables 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Appendix Table 5 VIF Test Expanded Model Independent Variables 
  
 
 
 
Variable VIF 
realGDPpc 2.08 
Urbanization 1.92 
lnPopulation 1.57 
MilitaryPersonnel 1.56 
Proximity to Liberalization 1.46 
Proximity to Autocratization 1.39 
NotFree 1.22 
Neighborhood_viol 1.08 
NumberViolOnsets 1.07 
NumberNonviolOnsets 1.06 
Neighborhood_nonviol 1.03 
Election 1.03 
Mean VIF 1.37 
Notes: Interaction term NotFree*Proximity to 
Autocratization and temporal polynomials excluded 
Variable VIF 
realGDPpc 2.09 
Urbanization 1.95 
lnPopulation 1.57 
MilitaryPersonnel 1.56 
Proximity to Liberalization 1.49 
Proximity to Autocratization 1.43 
NotFree 1.30 
Fuel Exports 1.09 
Neighborhood_viol 1.08 
NumberViolOnsets 1.08 
RegimeChange1to3 1.06 
NumberNonviolOnsets 1.06 
Neighborhood_nonviol 1.03 
Election 1.03 
Mean VIF 1.35 
Notes:  Notes: Interaction term NotFree*Proximity 
to Autocratization and temporal polynomials 
excluded 
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Appendix Table 6 Auxillary Models, Robustness Tests Expanded and Simplified Model 
  
 Expanded Model, excl. 
Nepal % %StdX 
Simplified Model, excl. 
Nepal % %StdX 
0 (No conflict onset, ref.cat) 
1 (Nonviolent campaign onset) 
 
NotFree -0.417 
(0.898) 
34.1  -0.071 
(0.778) 
-6.9  
ProximitytoAutocratization -1.443† 
(0.874) 
-76.4 -29.1   -2.153*** 
(0.610) 
-88.4 -40.5 
NotFree*ProximityAutocrat 0.587 
(1.458) 
79.9 22.9 -0.141 
(1.248) 
-13.2 -4.9 
ProximitytoLiberalization 1.247* 
(0.608) 
247.9 36.9 0.874† 
(0.483) 
139.6 24.7 
rGDPpc 0.000 
(0.000) 
0.0 8.3    
lnPopulation 0.436** 
(0.140) 
54.7 96.2    
Military Personnel t-1 0.000 
(0.000) 
0.0 6.7    
Election 0.866** 
(0.279) 
137.7     
Urbanization -0.007 
(0.011) 
-0.7 -15.6    
NonViolStabilityYears 0.057 
(0.111) 
     
NonViolStabilityYears2 0.002 
(0.006) 
     
NonViolStabilityYears3 -0.000 
(0.000) 
     
ViolStabilityYears 0.086 
(0.135) 
     
ViolStabilityYears2 -0.005 
(0.007) 
     
NonViolStabilityYears3 0.000 
(0.000) 
     
NumberNonViolOnsets 0.178*** 
(0.029) 
19.5 78.2    
NumberViolOnsets -0.036 
(0.093) 
-3.5 -7.0    
NeighborhoodViol -0.227 
(0.810) 
-20.3 -5.2    
NeighborhoodNonviol 0.140 
(1.180) 
15.1 1.8    
RegimeChange1to3 -0.018 
(0.052) 
-1.8 -5.8    
Fuel Exports -0.327 
(0.430) 
-27.9 -12.4    
North and Southeast Asia -1.407* 
(0.617) 
-75.5     
Central and South Asia -2.399* 
(1.000) 
-90.9     
Middle East and North 
Africa 
-1.603** 
(0.600) 
-79.9     
Sub-Saharan Africa -1.775*** 
(0.497) 
-83.0     
Latin America -1.029** 
(0.348) 
-64.3     
Oceania -13.439*** 
(1.126) 
-
100.0 
    
Constant -11.655*** 
(2.514) 
  -3.159*** 
(0.466) 
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(continued) Expanded Model, excl. 
Nepal % %StdX 
Simplified Model, excl. 
Nepal % %StdX 
2 (Violent campaign onset)       
NotFree 0.871 
(0.950) 
139.0  1.156 
(0.906) 
217.6  
ProximitytoAutocratization -0.384 
(0.754) 
-31.9 -8.8 0.161 
(0.757) 
17.4 4 
NotFree*ProximityAutocrat -0.775 
(1.249) 
-53.9 -23.9 -0.944 
(1.291) 
-61.1 -28.5 
ProximitytoLiberalization 0.830 
(0.634) 
129.3 23.2 1.334
*
 
(0.580) 
279.6 40.1 
rGDPpc -0.000
†
 
(0.000) 
-0.0 -77.5    
lnPopulation 0.284
*
 
(0.114) 
32.8 55.1    
Military Personnel t-1 -0.000 
(0.000) 
-0.0 -18.2    
Election -0.117 
(0.309) 
-11.1     
Urbanization 0.009 
(0.013) 
0.9 22.1    
NonViolStabilityYears 0.019 
(0.139) 
     
NonViolStabilityYears
2 
0.002 
(0.007) 
     
NonViolStabilityYears
3
 -0.000 
(0.000) 
     
ViolStabilityYears -0.044 
(0.088) 
     
ViolStabilityYears
2
 0.002 
(0.005) 
     
NonViolStabilityYears
3
 -0.000 
(0.000) 
     
NumberNonViolOnsets -0.008 
(0.059) 
-0.8 -2.7    
NumberViolOnsets 0.299
***
 
(0.044) 
34.9 82.7    
NeighborhoodViol 0.013 
(0.663) 
1.3 0.3    
NeighborhoodNonviol -0.607 
(1.503) 
-45.5 -7.4    
RegimeChange1to3 0.045 
(0.059) 
4.6 16.3    
Fuel Exports 0.043 
(0.357) 
4.4     
North and Southeast Asia -0.997 
(0.651) 
-63.1     
Central and South Asia -0.151 
(0.576) 
-14.1     
Middle East and North Africa 0.166 
(0.391) 
18.0     
Sub-Saharan Africa -0.612 
(0.388) 
-45.8     
Latin America -0.837 
(0.590) 
-56.7     
Oceania 0.891 
(0.821) 
143.7     
Constant -9.147
***
 
(2.500) 
  -5.222
***
 
(0.648) 
  
N 3226   3762   
Log pseudolikelihood 
Pseudo R
2 
-506.13 
0.156 
  -678.05 
0.019 
  
Notes : Clustered standard errors in parentheses, analysis of all states Free = 0 
†
 p < 0.10, 
*
 p < 0.05, 
**
 p < 0.01, 
***
 p < 0.001 
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Appendix Table 7Auxillary Models, Alternative Specifications of Repressive Dummies 
 Alternative specifications 
Base Model, excl. Nepal 
Alternative specifications 
Expamded Model 
0 (No conflict onset, ref.cat)   
1 (Nonviolent conflict onset)   
altNotFree 2.137* 
(1.067) 
1.750
† 
(1.008) 
ProximitytoAutocratization -0.435 
(0.675) 
-0.426 
(0.745 
NotFree*ProximityAutocrat -3.599
†
 
(2.019) 
-3.179 
(1.951) 
ProximitytoLiberalization 1.065
†
 
(0.551) 
1.077
†
 
(0.595) 
rGDPpc -0.000 
(0.000) 
-0.000* 
(0.000) 
lnPopulation 0.276** 
(0.106) 
0.340** 
(1.24) 
Military Personnel t-1 0.000* 
(0.000) 
0.000 
(0.000) 
Election 0.785** 
(0.264) 
0.761** 
(0.271) 
Urbanization 0.006 
(0.007) 
-0.002 
(0.009) 
NonViolStabilityYears 0.059 
(0.123) 
0.041 
(0.128) 
NonViolStabilityYears
2 
0.000 
(0.006) 
0.002 
(0.006) 
NonViolStabilityYears
3
 -0.000 
(0.000) 
-0.000 
(0.000) 
ViolStabilityYears 0.036 
(0.111) 
0.045 
(0.121) 
ViolStabilityYears
2
 -0.003 
(0.005) 
-0.003 
(0.006) 
ViolStabilityYears
3
 0.000 
(0.000) 
0.000 
(0.000) 
NumberNonViolOnsets 0.159*** 
(0.025) 
     0.166*** 
(0.026) 
NumberViolOnsets -0.029 
(0.087) 
-0.027 
(0.090) 
NeighborhoodViol -0.475 
(0.670) 
-0.209 
(0.645) 
NeighborhoodNonviol 0.451 
(0.924) 
0.342 
(1.045) 
RegimeChange1to3  -0.007 
(0.052) 
Fuel Exports  -0.275 
(0.440) 
North and Southeast Asia  -0.843 
(0.595) 
Central and South Asia  -1.855* 
(0.930) 
Middle East and North Africa  -0.814 
(0.526) 
Sub-Saharan Africa  -1.428** 
(0.461) 
Latin America  -0.694* 
(0.350) 
Oceania  -12.441*** 
(1.024) 
Constant -11.047*** 
(2.155) 
-10.756*** 
(2.375) 
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(continued) Alternative specifications 
Base Model, excl. Nepal 
Alternative specifications 
Expamded Model 
2 (Violent conflict onset) 
altNotFree 1.530* 
(0.649) 
1.357
† 
(0.710) 
ProximitytoAutocratization -0.304 
(0.616) 
-0.136 
(0.664) 
NotFree*ProximityAutocrat -1.404 
(0.961) 
-1.283 
(0.935) 
ProximitytoLiberalization 0.976 
(0.603) 
0.799 
(0.624) 
rGDPpc -0.000* 
(0.000) 
-0.000 
(0.000) 
lnPopulation   0.294** 
(0.103) 
0.291* 
(0.115) 
Military Personnel t-1  -0.000 
(0.000) 
-0.000 
(0.000) 
Election -0.048 
(0.290) 
-0.055 
(0.290) 
Urbanization 0.012 
(0.011) 
0.009 
(0.013) 
NonViolStabilityYears -0.003 
(0.125) 
0.032 
(0.145) 
NonViolStabilityYears
2 
0.003 
(0.006) 
0.001 
(0.007) 
NonViolStabilityYears
3
 -0.000 
(0.000) 
-0.000 
(0.000) 
ViolStabilityYears 0.061 
(0.085) 
-0.053 
(0.085) 
ViolStabilityYears
2
 0.002 
(0.005) 
0.002 
(0.005) 
NonViolStabilityYears
3
 -0.000 
(0.000) 
-0.000 
(0.000) 
NumberNonViolOnsets  -0.007 
(0.057) 
-0.003 
(0.057) 
NumberViolOnsets   0.305*** 
(0.044) 
0.305*** 
(0.044) 
NeighborhoodViol 0.093 
(0.541) 
-0.059 
(0.634) 
NeighborhoodNonviol -0.539 
(1.21) 
-0.483 
(1.249) 
RegimeChange1to3 
 
0.055 
(0.056) 
Fuel Exports 
 
0.042 
(0.334) 
North and Southeast Asia 
 
-0.831 
(0.633) 
Central and South Asia 
 
-0.091 
(0.569) 
Middle East and North Africa 
 
0.266 
(0.399) 
Sub-Saharan Africa 
 
-0.477 
(0.369) 
Latin America 
 
-0.674 
(0.536) 
Oceania 
 
0.236 
(0.649) 
Constant -9.881*** 
(2.202) 
-9.610*** 
(2.474) 
N 3,778 3761 
Log pseudolikelihood 
Pseudo R
2 
-541.54 
0.137 
-531.57 
0.152 
Notes : Clustered standard errors in parentheses, analysis of all states Free = 0 
†
 p < 0.10, 
*
 p < 0.05, 
**
 p < 0.01, 
***
 p < 0.001 
 
 
